


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS



TOWARD MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE
SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

by

Samuel L. Tate

December, 1994

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

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**TOWARD MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY
IN NORTHEAST ASIA**

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The U.S. military preponderance of power in Northeast Asia, based on the Cold War systems of collective defense, is no longer adequate to cope with the complex threats to peace that have reemerged since 1990. It may be preferable to move beyond the old Cold War division of the Soviet Union, China and North Korea on the one side and the U.S., Japan and South Korea on the other, toward a system of multilateral cooperative security. The nations of Northeast Asia are searching for new modes of ensuring their security in the era of uncertainty marking the post-Cold War period. There is a need for cooperative security in Northeast Asia that is aimed at engaging all of the nations in dialogue and cooperation. A cooperative system would focus on reducing tensions, preventing war and diffusing the potential threats to regional stability. Although there are no clear and immediate dangers in Northeast Asia, there are many unresolved problems of security that warrant multilateral cooperation. Due to the importance of the seas and growing concern about maritime issues, maritime security could be a catalyst for establishing multilateral cooperative security. The United States is in a unique position to cooperate with Northeast Asian nations in maritime cooperative security. Finally, multilateral cooperative security will allow all of the nations involved to spend less on defense and concentrate more on the goal of creating an environment conducive to modernization and prosperity.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The American preponderance of power was the primary agent of peace and stability in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. This power rested primarily on U.S. nuclear capability, the superiority of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, and the U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea mutual security agreements. An adversarial relationship existed between the communist nations and the U.S.-constructed anticommunist bilateral alliance system from the Korean War (1950) to the collapse of the Soviet Union (c.1990). Tensions were constant and the danger of global war was imminent.

The threat of a global holocaust virtually disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Tensions that could have resulted in global war have been reduced. A miasma of regional threats have replaced global tensions. The U.S. military preponderance of power, based on the Cold War systems of collective defense, is no longer solely adequate to cope with the complex threats to peace that have reemerged in significance since 1990. It may be preferable to move beyond the old Cold War division of the Soviet Union, China and North Korea on the one side and the U.S., Japan and South Korea on the other, toward a system of multilateral cooperative security. More than the traditional, rigid, two-sided confrontational alignment of powers is warranted.

Doubts about U.S. regional strategy and the ambitions of Japan and China shape the security environment of Northeast Asia. A perceived power vacuum and the power ambitions of the regional powers have led to security concern over arms races, nuclear proliferation, and a proliferation of local conflicts. The nations of Northeast Asia are searching for new modes of ensuring their security in the era of uncertainty marking the post-Cold War period. These elements make the maintenance of the status quo undesirable.

Furthermore, security can no longer be based solely on military methods of peace maintenance. Security is no longer conceived of in narrow military terms. There is a need for cooperative security in Northeast Asia that is aimed at engaging all of the regional nations in dialogue and cooperation. Because of the atmosphere of distrust and the potential for conflict, it is inevitable that a multilateral approach to security will be difficult. The nations of the region are wary of collective security or collective defense based on European models. Asian nations view these models as incapable of addressing their security needs. Northeast Asian powers are also concerned that any nation proposing a collective multilateral security system is trying to dominate the region. Any acceptable arrangement must involve an on-going series of dialogue or ad hoc meetings but not a formal institution.

A multilateral system of cooperation, in which each of the regional powers are equal players, however, seems the best approach. Any informal system of cooperation, transparency and confidence building measures would not be dominated by any single nation or coalition. Nor would it be aimed at any nation or coalition.

Instead, a cooperative system would focus on reducing tensions, preventing war and diffusing the potential threats to regional stability. Although there are no clear and immediate dangers in Northeast Asia, there are many unresolved problems of security that warrant multilateral cooperation. All regional powers are concerned about the emergence of hegemonic competition and the resultant arms races, nuclear proliferation, maritime security, and environmental protection.

Due to the importance of the seas and growing concern about maritime issues, maritime security could be a catalyst for establishing multilateral cooperative security. The

United States is in a unique position to cooperate with Northeast Asian nations in maritime cooperative security. The U.S. strategy in the Pacific has traditionally been maritime in focus. Based on A Strategic Framework for the Pacific Rim and "Cooperative Engagement," this strategy will continue. Both strategies already address maritime cooperation. Maritime cooperation and transparency are roles the U.S. participates in world wide with a solid record.

Finally, the goal of multilateral cooperative security in the post-Cold War will enable the U.S. to reduce its defense spending in Northeast Asia. Multilateral cooperation and tension reduction will also encourage the U.S. to stop pressuring Japan and South Korea to share in their defense burden. Cooperation in the reduction of the threat of military confrontation will allow all of the nations involved to spend less on defense and concentrate more on the goal of creating an environment conducive to modernization and prosperity.

I. INTRODUCTION

The American preponderance of power was the primary agent of peace and stability in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. This power rested primarily on U.S. nuclear capability, the superiority of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, and the U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea mutual security agreements. An adversarial relationship existed between the communist nations and the U.S.-constructed anticommunist bilateral alliance system from the Korean War (1950) to the collapse of the Soviet Union (c.1990). Tensions were constant and the danger of global war was imminent.

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More than the traditional, rigid, two-sided confrontational alignment of powers is warranted. I do not assume the necessity of any formal structures, for example a Concert of Powers nineteenth century style, or a Security Conference for Asia modeled on the contemporary European organization. I also do not advocate ridding ourselves precipitously of our bilateral security agreements. Some form of temporary military alliance may be useful in some specific situation.

The objective of this thesis will be to answer the following questions:

- What are the common interests and objectives of the nations involved in Northeast Asia?
- What are the major obstacles to achieving these objectives?
- How can differences and obstacles be overcome to achieve a common approach to multilateral cooperative security?
- How will multilateral cooperative security affect current bilateral alliances in the region?
- Is a U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia necessary to the maintenance of stability?
- If so, how can the U.S. in cooperation with the nations of Northeast Asia best support multilateral cooperative security?

At the outset this thesis will discuss the importance of Northeast Asia to Asian-Pacific security and U.S. national interests. It will stress the maritime nature of the region and the importance of maritime trade and security to regional stability. Then it will differentiate the concepts "multilateral cooperative security," "multilateralism" and "collective security/collective defense."

These fundamental assumptions will be followed by an analysis of the Northeast Asia security system as it existed during the Cold War. Next, I shall make clear the nature of the contemporary security system in Northeast Asia. It is significant that the Cold War mentality continues. Distrust pervades the region because of the lingering Cold War bilateral collective defense system and a divided Korea. The end of the Cold War has also unleashed a multitude of elements, previously submerged by the bipolar confrontation, that threaten the security environment. These include the results of the breakup of the USSR, possible emergence of a

regional hegemon coupled with a steady U.S. withdrawal from the region, ethnic conflicts, and the destabilizing results of modernization. The importance of each of these elements is apparent in analyzing the security situation of the regional powers in relation to their neighbors, including their historical perspective toward multilateral arrangements. This process will expose the inadequacies of the present system and will explore avenues towards a better future.

This research will lead to a proposal outlining steps toward multilateral cooperative security in Northeast Asia. These steps will be comprehensive, covering all aspects of security. Stress will be placed on efforts toward naval transparency and cooperation due to the maritime nature of the region. Without transparency, the capability of naval forces to concentrate in the waters of a neighboring state and the opaque nature of submarines would add to the dangers inherent in the maritime environment. The destructive capacity and the widespread proliferation of modern naval armaments point out the need for a new security mechanism.

I will test the hypothesis that multilateral cooperative security and diplomacy aimed at reducing tensions, building confidence, and encouraging transparency is a further sensible and realistic approach to the problems of stability and security. This would allow the U.S. to expand the means at its disposal to the desired end of ensuring stability in Northeast Asia.

A. IMPORTANCE OF ASIA TO U.S. INTERESTS

Asia should top the list of U.S. overseas interests based on all measures of security. In economic terms, U.S. two-way trade with the Asia Pacific region is some \$380 billion, 30-40% higher than U.S. two-way trade with Europe. The Asia Pacific region at the start of the 1990s, accounted for 40% of all U.S. trade and 2.5 million jobs. American trans-Pacific

trade is expected to double its trans-Atlantic trade by the year 2000. U.S. businesses have recently invested more than \$6.2 billion in East Asia. As of 1994, East Asia accounts for one-third of U.S. global trade. In the last thirty years, trade with just China and Japan has grown more than fivefold. Together the U.S. and Japan represent 40% of world GNP. The U.S. is the largest market for Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan while these are among the largest U.S. markets. Some economists predict that East Asia will constitute 50% of world production by the year 2000. The benefits of these positive trends can only be continued if the region remains politically stable and free from conflict.

The maritime nature of Asia contributes to the volatility of the region. Ninety percent of U.S. trade is transported by sea. A significant amount of this trade transits the sea routes of the Asia-Pacific region. Almost 50% of Japanese trade transits the "territorially contentious" South China Sea (Skaridov, Thompson and Yang, 1994, p. 11). The shipping lanes between Asia and the energy sources of the Middle East and the markets of Europe are among the least protected and most vulnerable of the world. Freedom of the seas is beneficial to trade and prosperity in the region. Any real or perceived threat to these sea lanes has the potential for sparking regional conflict.

The most prominent territorial disputes in Asia consist of maritime claims. Examples include the Paracels, the Spratly Archipelago, the Senkaku Islands, and the Kurile Islands.¹ Furthermore,

¹The Paracel Island group in the South China Sea is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. The Spratlys, also in the South China Sea, are claimed by the above three and Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. In Northeast Asia, China, Taiwan and Japan have disputed claims over the Diaoydo/Senkaku Islands and China and South Korea dispute the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Yellow Sea.

the delimitation of the boundaries and resources of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) created by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) are potential sources of conflict. (Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 13)

Among all these security concerns in Asia, the gravest exists in the Northeast. These include:

- The peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, complicated by North Korea's nuclear policy, presents a unique challenge to regional stability.
- Japan and China's great power potential and their impact on the military, economic and political balance of power in the region.
- The reunification of China and peaceful resolution of her territorial claims.
- The possible consequences of modernization and unequal development within China.
- The regional implications of internal instability in China after the death of Deng Xiaoping.
- Russia's future impact on regional stability due to either aggressive foreign policy or domestic instability.

Regional security concerns and the maritime nature of Asia have contributed to the proliferation of high technology arms in regional naval forces. China and Japan have the largest navies in East Asia aside from Russia and the U.S. China has increased her fleet of major combatants (destroyers, frigates, and corvettes) by about 45% in the last decade. Japan has increased its fleet of major combatants by 75%. (Morgan, 1994, p. 39) The increase has been both quantitative and qualitative. The lack of transparency concerning these buildups and other maritime issues are cause for concern. They also present an area in which common interests are involved and the potential for multilateral cooperative security exists.

B. DEFINITION OF NORTHEAST ASIA

U.S. interests in Asia have traditionally been most closely tied with the nations mentioned above, Japan, China, Korea and Russia in both economic and military terms. These nations form the Asia-Pacific subregion called Northeast Asia. The reasons for limiting discussion about multilateral cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific to the subregion of Northeast Asia include:

- The Asian security issues mentioned in the previous section, with the exception of the Spratlys and Paracel Islands disputes, fall within Northeast Asia. These issues constitute the major threats to Asian security and have global implications.
- Three of the nations of Northeast Asia, China, Japan and South Korea, are the leading nations of Asia-Pacific economic development.
- The subregion includes the second (Japan) and third (China) largest economies in the world behind the U.S.
- The subregion consists of two confirmed nuclear powers (Russia and China), and Japan, South Korea and North Korea are all nuclear capable.
- Additionally, the interests of both Russia, a former superpower, and the U.S., arguably the last remaining superpower, are involved in Northeast Asia. The bipolar Cold War system of alliances and power politics in Asia was centered in Northeast Asia and is largely responsible for the current security situation in the Asia-Pacific.

Any attempt at cooperative security in Northeast Asia will influence the security environment in the rest of the Asia-Pacific. Likewise, any discussion of multilateral cooperative security in Asia must cover the subregion of Northeast Asia. Although there are many obstacles to cooperative security in the subregion, enough common security concerns exist to merit exploration.

On the other hand, a broader Asian wide security system may be too idealistic. The predominant school of thought within Pacific academic circles is that a comprehensive regional security system is not feasible any time in the near future. No common adversary or interests exist to unite the entire region in common endeavor or under a common framework for military cooperation (Wiseman, 1993, p. 45). Subregional cooperative security should be realized before any broader application is attempted.

C. DEFINITION OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY

This thesis will use the term "multilateral" without the "ism." In the traditional sense multilateralism is associated with collective security or collective defense marked by formal structures, control by governing bodies and international organizations (Ruggie, 1992, pp. 566, 572-573). "Collective security" or "collective defense" refer to an alliance system (like the Council for Cooperation and Security in Europe or NATO) in which an ally *provides insurance* that it will come to the aid of a nation under attack.

"Multilateral" denotes a more general relationship among states in which there is a sense of equal and reciprocal treatment and cooperation. "Multilateral" refers to the character and general order of relations between nations, not necessarily entrenched in formal institutions. (Ruggie, 1992, p. 574)

By contrast, "cooperative security" is directed at preventing imminent threats from developing in the first place.

The central purpose of cooperative security arrangements is to prevent war...primarily by preventing the means for successful aggression from being assembled, thus also obviating the need for states so threatened to make their own counter preparations. Cooperative security thus displaces

the centerpiece of security planning from preparing to counter threats to preventing such threats from arising. (Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 1992, p. 7)

The common regional problems that a system of cooperative security attempts to resolve are more comprehensive than the traditional military threats. A cooperative security system attempts to foster

economic cooperation; joint consideration of environmental problems; development of humanitarian contacts; activation of cultural and human exchanges; coordination of measures against drugs-proliferation and international terrorism. (Bunin, 1993, p. 17)

Collective security or defense is confrontational and exclusive. It pits one group of nations against another, the aggressors and the defenders. Cooperative security is inclusive. It is a relationship in which no one power is aligned or allied with another, aimed at countering or containing a third power. In Northeast Asia cooperative security should attempt to engage all of the nations of the subregion in a working relationship and "habit of dialogue" extending across a broad range of security issues.

A continuation of the old alliance balance of power system based on confrontation and imminent threats is an unimaginative answer to the security environment in Northeast Asia. Such a process would allow the current military buildups to develop into arms races. On the other hand, cooperative security will encourage arms reduction, a common solution of security issues, and a continuation of economic prosperity for all nations of the region.

II. THE NEED FOR A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM

A. THE COLD WAR SECURITY SYSTEM IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Dissimilar post-World War II influences caused the postwar security regime in Asia to develop differently than in Europe. Northeast Asia lacked many of the unifying conditions that influenced the creation of collective security and collective defense mechanisms in Western Europe. Asia was not as completely dominated by the two multilateral security alliances built around the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The threat perceptions were different, focusing on either the PRC or the USSR. (Grant, 1993, p.2)

The physical and cultural features of Asia played a significant role in the development of the postwar security system. Europe is a land region but the Asia-Pacific is an oceanic region, further exacerbating the difficulties of communication and cooperation. Asian countries are also more politically and culturally diverse than European nations.

National diversity played a role in the emergence of variations of communist party rule. After the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split, international communist revolution yielded to do-it-yourself national revolution.

National variants of communist party rule, especially in China, ensured that the international relations of the region were always as much affected by nationalism as communism---which is one reason why the collapse of communist rule in Europe in 1989 did not spread to the Pacific rim. And the absence of Soviet control meant that the East Asians were always freer than the East Europeans to pursue their own agendas. (Segal, 1991, p. 755)

National economic policy also prevented multilateral cooperation from evolving to meet security threats. The command economies of Japan and South Korea were not conducive to regional integration. Japan increased its power through

global trade, refusing to play any significant regional political role. Both South Korea and Japan relied on economic relations with Europe and America and eschewed regional economic ties. (Segal, 1991, p. 756)

Therefore, security strategy in Northeast Asia evolved into a network of bilateral treaties linking the United States to Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia on one side and the Soviet Union to North Korea and Vietnam on the other. In the immediate postwar period Nationalist China was aligned with the U.S. However, after the civil war the victorious communists eventually allied mainland China with the Soviet Union.

Throughout the Cold War period the principle goal of the United States was the containment of the Soviet Union. Japan became the only possible anchor for U.S. regional security policy since China had turned to "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and the Korean Peninsula remained divided. In 1948 the U.S. implemented NSC-13, which was designed to strengthen Japan against communism through economic recovery (Staples, 1989, p. 15). The economic power of Japan and the other nations of East Asia was largely due to the American security umbrella. The United States subordinated its own economic interests to the security needs of containment. America opened its market to promote the development of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, while letting the markets of the East Asian allies remain restrictive. (Chace, 1993, p. 85)

The communist threat to Japan became apparent with the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between Communist China and the Soviet Union, regarding U.S.-backed Japan as their enemy. The communist threat to Japan became real with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 24, 1950. (Staples, 1989, p.15)

After the Korean War, South Korea looked to the United States for protection against an invasion from the North under

the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. Japan had also signed the Security Treaty with the United States after regaining sovereignty in 1952.

After the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, China shared the U.S. goal of containing the Soviets. Starting in 1972, the U.S. and the PRC began to normalize relations and engage in cooperative endeavors aimed at preventing Soviet regional hegemony (Grant, 1993, p. 2).

The American military presence in Asia was thus based on the preoccupation of the U.S. and its allies with the Cold War. There was little ground on which the Asian nations could base regionalism or multilateralism in Northeast Asia. The old collective defense system preserved peace in Northeast Asia but it became time to consider a broader and more balanced arrangement. No longer satisfied with being a patron or client, every nation aspired to a relationship based on equality and reciprocity and more attuned to mutual economic cooperation as well as mutual security.

B. CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

At least four general trends in the security environment of Northeast Asia account for changes in national security policies.

- Relative tranquility of Asia. The entire region enjoys relative tranquility, political stability, and a continuous economic boom. The decline of the superpower military rivalry encourages dialogue between former adversaries.
- Economic development is assuming a greater role in national security policies. The nations of Northeast Asia all wish to maintain a stable environment for economic development and prosperity. This has led to an increase in cooperation attempting to resolve disputes rather than resorting to military force.
- Relative Decline of U.S. as a superpower. The U.S. has adopted a strategic policy of focusing on its domestic

economy. This policy is driven by domestic pressure to reduce the budget deficit, downsize the military, and enhance economic productivity to compete with the growing Asian economies.

The perception in Northeast Asia is that U.S. foreign policy has focused on handling the leftover problems of the Cold War in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the Middle East. These factors have absorbed the resources of the last remaining superpower. Therefore, the U.S. does not possess enough resources to play a greater role in the Asia-Pacific. (Chen, 1993, p. 239; Pollack, 1990, p. 717) Contrary to the belief that post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy would focus on Asia, the U.S. is still occupied in Europe and the Middle East.

The relative decline of U.S. economic and military power has left the impression that there is a power vacuum in Northeast Asia. The concern is that economically powerful Japan or an ascendant China will emerge to fill a hegemonic position in Northeast Asia.

- Multilateral diplomacy and institutions are gaining prominence as forums for policy coordination and cooperation. The search continues for such a forum adaptable to the needs of Northeast Asia.

The previous trends have provided impetus for nations to search for alternate modes of providing for a stable environment apart from military means, confrontation and reliance on a continued U.S. presence. There are not yet any multilateral forums focused specifically on Northeast Asia, but these nations (except North Korea) participate in region wide forums.

C. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS

The post-Cold War world is marked by competition "between the forces of integration and fragmentation." (Gaddis, 1992,

p. 196) Progress toward liberal trade practices such as the European Union, NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association) and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) are examples of economic integration and cooperation.² The increasing role of the United Nations and the coalition it sanctioned to fight Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, are further examples of limited integration. Perhaps the most promising vision of post Cold War integration was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany.

On the other hand, the forces of fragmentation are always at work. The breakup of the former Soviet Union into multiple political entities, the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, and the peaceful split of the former Czechoslovakia along ethnic lines, are all examples of the fragmentation of the world order. Economic protectionism threatens to unravel the achievements of integrating forces as well. Bilateral actions outside GATT, the trade friction between the U.S. and Japan, and perhaps even NAFTA and the European Union, can be viewed as manifestations of economic fragmentation.

The disappearance of the bipolar Soviet-U.S. system has also given impetus to fragmenting forces in Northeast Asia. The fragmenting forces that were bottled up during Soviet containment now appear as obstacles to multilateral cooperative security, or, as I prefer to call them, unresolved problems. They are more diverse and more difficult to counter than the clear-cut East-West rivalry of the Cold War. The continued Cold War climate, the conflicting interests of the major nations of the region, hegemonic rivalry between Japan, China, and Russia, a regional arms buildup, nuclear

²NAFTA is widely considered to be an example of the integration of nations willing to adopt free trade practices. However, there are opponents of NAFTA, who view NAFTA as a trade bloc aimed at competing with Japan, the Asian NIC's and the European Economic Community.

proliferation and territorial disputes are the most formidable of these unresolved problems.

1. Continued Cold War Climate

A significant factor contributing to the need for rethinking security strategy in Northeast Asia is the continued Cold War climate and the distrust that this lends to the regional security environment. This climate is largely due to the continued division of the Korean Peninsula and the nature of the U.S. bilateral alliances. The continuation of Cold War style hostility between North and South is a reminder that the post 1990 euphoria that spread through Europe cannot be taken for granted in Northeast Asia.

The continued climate of distrust is built into U.S. bilateral alliances and strategic policy. An examination of The Department of Defense Report A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim supports this view. The report says that the United States remains committed to the security of its *friends and allies*. The report says nothing about the stability and prosperity of the other nations in the Pacific Rim. (Buss, 1994, p. 38; DOD, 1992, p. 3) China and Russia accuse the U.S. of acting as if the Cold War still exists.

The Russians claim that they remain the focus of U.S. global strategy as it applies to the Pacific. The U.S. strategy is still designed to protect Japan and South Korea

through the destruction, or threat of destruction, of Russia as a major Pacific power by planning to conduct preemptive blows against its Far Eastern infrastructure and by operations against its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. (Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 3)

Russia does not dispute that the U.S. has an interest in maintaining its bilateral alliances and a military presence in Asia. However, Russia would like a statement declaring that

the U.S.-Japan treaty is not aimed against any other countries in the region. (Bunin, 1993, p. 7)

Similarly, China, the last viable socialist country in Northeast Asia, has a dim perception of U.S. diplomacy and strategy. A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim lists China as one "of the five remaining Communist regimes in the world,.... facing the reality of Communism's economic and political failure." (DOD, 1992, p. 10) China believes that the U.S. is committed to ensuring the elimination of Communism. U.S. efforts to impose its principles of market economics and political democracy worldwide are viewed by Beijing as destabilizing and as a threat to China's communist regime.

China sees 'peaceful evolution' and 'U.S. interference in China's internal affairs' as merely the latest means for the United States to accomplish its objective....In China's view, the United States does not yet act on the premise that the Cold War is over. The United States is accused of maintaining the mightiest military establishment in the world for protection against a threat that has disappeared. (Buss, 1994, p. 23)

According to these views, the U.S. has yet to adopt a post-Cold War strategy in Northeast Asia.

Both China and Russia have taken steps to improve relations with South Korea and Japan while the U.S. continues to isolate North Korea as a pariah state. The October 21, 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreement is a step in the right direction and will hopefully change this situation. In 1993 the bilateral trade volume between China and South Korea was expected to reach \$13 billion, making China South Korea's third largest trading partner behind the United States and Japan. (Song, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, hereafter KJDA, 1993, p. 233) Substantial economic relations with China have laid the

foundation for further diplomatic cooperation, starting with the PRC's recognition of South Korea in August of 1992.

PRC-Japanese relations have also witnessed a thaw since the end of the Cold War. Chinese President Jiang Zemin told Prime Minister Hosokawa during their March 20, 1994, meeting that China was willing to strengthen its cooperation with Japan to ensure long-term stability in Asia and to contribute to a new world order. (Beijing Review, hereafter BR, March 28, 1994, p. 4)

The landmark ROK-Soviet diplomatic event occurred during the meeting between Roh Tae Woo and President Gorbachev in San Francisco on June 4, 1990. In September of 1990, the United Nations Summit of foreign ministers announced an agreement between South Korea and the USSR that diplomatic relations would be maintained. (Olsen, 1992, pp. 146-147) In his message to the Prime Minister of Japan, Boris Yeltsin said that Russia was "willing" to see Japan as "a partner and potential ally" bound by "common and eternal human values." (Bunin, 1993, p. 13) Japan in return has stated that it is prepared to provide financial assistance to Russia within the G-7 framework (Bunin, 1993, p. 12). Thus, China and Russia point out that their relations with former adversaries have thawed. Meanwhile the U.S. maintains alliances originally directed against communism and continues to isolate North Korea.

2. Hegemonic Competition

The breakup of the former Soviet Union has led to a multipolar security environment in which the nations of the region still fear the rise of a new hegemonic power. The fall of the Soviet Union and the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. cause the nations of Asia to perceive that there is a regional power vacuum. The possibility of a resurgent Russia, Japan or China filling this vacuum alone or descending into hostilities with each other in the process is cause for concern. These

concerns are enmeshed in anxiety over nuclear proliferation and possible arms races.

One object of this concern is a resurgent Russia. Russia is sending contradictory signals to its Asian neighbors.

It is apparently torn, on the one hand, between attempting to retain the Soviet Union's earlier great power status in the region through a continuing large-scale military presence and, on the other hand, seeking a low military profile and a highly focused economic role in the region. (Jordan, Taylor and Korb, 1993, p. 377)

Another fear is an economically and militarily powerful Japan in the wake of a diminishing U.S. presence in Northeast Asia. Japan protected her economic and political growth from sensitive international concern over a resurgent Japan during the Cold War era within the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship.

Nevertheless, the growth in Japanese military capability,...its increasing political role in peacekeeping operations, and its impending permanent membership in the UN Security Council--all of which increase its political influence and... military activities outside its borders...all portend a more active diplomatic and military role for Japan on the global and regional stage. (Song, 1993, p. 7)

Japan's expanding security role outside Northeast Asia with U.S. encouragement has also become a dominant issue in the future of the region. Defining and reaching agreement, both domestically and internationally, on the means of exercising a role commensurate with her power will continue to be a dilemma for the Japanese and the nations of Northeast Asia. The Japanese public remains uneasy about a military resurgence and its neighbors have not forgotten the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" of World War II. China, South Korea and other nations of Asia welcome Japanese investment but

simultaneously they fear Japanese economic and military domination (Chace, 1992, p. 87).

China's expansion and modernization is the newest cause of concern about a possible hegemon in Northeast Asia. The PRC's defense budget has increased by 98% since 1988. Between 1990-1992 the defense budget has increased by 13-15% each year. (Kristof, 1993, p. 65; Manning, 1994, p. 49) China's modernization program is focused on improving the quality of its strategic forces and acquiring better air and sea power projection capabilities. (Hu, 1993, pp. 125-126)

Apart from a desire to enforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the PRC's military preparations appear to be animated by concern over the possibility of a resurgent nationalist Russia, worst case fears of Japanese intentions, and a nuclear India. (Manning, 1994, p. 49)

These nations in turn see China's defense modernization as a possible threat to their security. If events continue along the security dilemma track, arms races and open conflict are the historical result.

3. Arms Buildups

All of the regional nations are modernizing their military forces. Most of the modernization is aimed at improving force projection capabilities. It is estimated that the total military expenditures of all Asian countries will be \$131 billion in 1995. "It is the maritime capabilities which are at the forefront of the defense acquisition programmes." (Ji, Asian Defense Journal, hereafter ADJ, 1994, p. 22) China continues to improve its nuclear ballistic missile submarine capability and there have been reports that it intends to buy or build an aircraft carrier sometime in the future. It has already purchased SU-27 naval aircraft from Russia. Japan is building \$1 billion Aegis destroyers, Taiwan has bought F-16's

and Mirage 2000's, South Korea plans to build seventeen new destroyers, North Korea has bought MIG-29's from Russia and similar advances are occurring in ASEAN nations. (Grant, 1994, p. 60; Preston, 1993, pp. 60-64)

Russia maintains a continued presence of large numbers of troops in Russia's Far East and her intentions toward Northeast Asia are unclear.

For most of East Asia, with the important exception of China, Russia is not so different from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's large physical presence was for them Russian. Russia possesses nearly all of the resources of interest to them. Russia holds the key to solving leftover issues, such as the Northern Territories dispute or the military competition in Northeast Asia. (Legvold, 1992, p. 12)

Internal problems within the Russian military and the economic crisis have limited Russia's role to a regional land power in Asia. Moscow has had to abandon its former intentions of improving significant air and naval power projection forces in the region. This has reduced concern among Chinese, American and Japanese defense planners. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 532)

However, though Russia has decreased the number of its weapons in the Far East it is simultaneously moving more technologically advanced weapons dismantled in Europe to the region. The advanced weapons along with the forty divisions remaining in the region leads some Northeast Asian analysts to believe that Russia may be attempting to maintain the appearance of great power status in the region (Glaser, 1993, p. 255; Rhee, 1993, p. 5).

Besides its remaining military power, neighbors are concerned about Russia's economically motivated arms transfers. Conversion of defense industries to domestic production has caused an outflow of weapons and technical specialists to other nations. "'The fire sale' of weapons

from the former Soviet Union is creating...unique buying opportunities for some countries." (Bracken, 1993, p. 3) These sales allow countries to upgrade their military equipment much more quickly than if they had to develop the weapons on their own. As of 1992, China was the largest buyer of Russian arms (Jordan et al., 1993, p. 378).

Japan and China are both increasing their military budgets while the defense expenditures of the other nations in the region are being significantly reduced. Japan continues to buildup its military despite a U.S. presence and the fact that its military budget ranks second in the world. Japan's modern Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) ranks seventh in the world and it conducts maritime operations out to 1,000 NM of its homeland. (Ji, 1994, p. 2)

The status quo of the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be inadvisable. Continuing the American military shield over Japan perpetuates an unhealthy situation. Four decades of protection has created a sense of detachment from any responsibility for regional security. It has also caused American resentment over protecting its chief economic rival. (Gibney, 1992, p. 532) Some changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance from time to time may be in order. Meanwhile, China and South Korea feel that America's burdensharing agenda coupled with a perceived decrease in U.S. commitment give impetus to Japan's military buildup.

There is a dichotomy in the discussion over the modernization of the Chinese defense establishment, especially the PLA(N). "The reasons for the modernization and growth of the PLA(N) are unclear, as are China's strategic intentions." (Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 5) China's annual defense budget has grown 13.6% since 1990. However, in a meeting on March 20, 1994 between Chinese Premier Li Peng and Prime Minister Hosokawa, Li Peng stated that China has not stationed any soldiers in foreign territories and that its military budget

is among the lowest of all nations in both absolute and per-capita terms. (BR, March 28, 1994, p. 12)

China's 1993 defense budget accounted for only 1.5% of GNP. Though Japan's defense budget is only 1% of its GNP it is still three times greater than China's. (Buss, 1994, pp. 9-10; Ji, ADJ, 1994, p. 24) Furthermore, China's fleet is still largely obsolescent, limited in scope, endurance and sophistication. On the other hand, it is the only nation in Asia building SLBM equipped nuclear subs, and it maintains the largest conventional sub flotilla. The PRC is also improving its amphibious and air-to-air refueling capability. Although China's maritime strategy has changed its emphasis from coastal defense to offshore defense, China points out that it has no bases on foreign soil and no interests in seeking spheres of influence (Ji, 1994, p. 19).

Many countries of the Asian-Pacific are engaging in defense buildups to defend their maritime interests. It may be more a sign of increased economic strength and national self-confidence than an act of competition. However,

in the process of improving naval weapons, many countries have focused on the increase of naval projection force including maritime long-range air power, anti-ship missiles, more capable surface combatants, and submarines. These strike capabilities tend, in general, to be more inflammatory than other defensive capabilities. (Ji, 1994, p. 3)

The U.S. and Russia are both maritime powers in Northeast Asia. Both navies are being reduced, but both will maintain sufficient maritime presence to protect their national interests. Very little of the naval transparency that existed in Europe near the end of the Cold War has spread to the Pacific. Naval cooperation is virtually nonexistent. There

are no INCSEA (Agreement to Prevent Incidents at Sea) or DMA (Dangerous Military Activities) agreements in Asia.³

Except those agreements still in force between Russia...and the United States, and a few bilateral subregional treaties, no broadly recognized procedures provide guidelines for the conduct of naval operations within the region. (Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 14)

The process of an arms buildup without clearly stated purposes may eventually lead to conflict. If there is any unresolved problem that calls for multilateral cooperative security, it is the continuing arms buildup in Northeast Asia.

4. Proliferation of Nuclear and Advanced Missile Technology

The proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction is perhaps the greatest unresolved problem of all. The climate of distrust between the U.S. and China and between the other nations of the region is a central theme in this issue. Nuclear proliferation and arms sales overlap with the issue of transparency between nations and the military buildups taking place in the region in the midst of a reduced U.S. presence.

The question of North Korean nuclear intentions is not whether they have nuclear weapons but *why* they want nuclear weapons and how they may use them. The heads of the KGB and the CIA have admitted that North Korea already has enough plutonium to make at least one bomb (Suh, 1993, p. 70). North Korea has already tested an intermediate range missile, demonstrating the capability to deliver a nuclear or chemical

³An incidents-at-sea agreement was to be signed during the September 1992 summit meeting between President Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa that was subsequently canceled. (Mochizuki, 1993, p. 153)

warhead within a radius of 1,000KM (Song, 1993, p. 5). The issue of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is wrapped up in the mistrust and Cold War mentality that still exists between North and South Korea. It is an issue that involves at least five different nations with very different political systems and security interests.

China occupies a special position in the region as a nuclear power. Nuclear weapons accord an already great power even more international leverage. Beijing's policies with respect to nuclear and missile proliferation causes great concern to the United States. China continues to contribute to international arms proliferation through sales of its short and medium range missile systems to Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. (Rhee, 1993, p. 6) China has also aided the nuclear programs of over forty countries, including Iraq, Algeria, Iran, Pakistan and Brazil. It is the fourth largest weapons seller in the world behind the United States, Russia and France. (Buss, 1994, p. 42)

China claims to share international concern about nuclear proliferation. However, China interprets U.S. arms control policies as interference in China's internal security policies. Zhao Guilin, a professor at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, wrote in the June 30, 1992 issue of Contemporary International Relations:

The United States can possess nuclear forces sufficient to wipe out the world 10 times over, nevertheless it may interfere as it likes with other nations that possess nuclear facilities for self defense or even peaceful purposes. The United States may become the world's biggest arms dealer, selling tens of billions of dollars worth of high technology weapons to the Middle East each year, but when other countries send a single shipload of munitions to the Middle East, the United States surveils the ship. (Quoted in Buss, 1994, p. 23)

China expects to be accorded the same rights as the Western powers to develop nuclear weapons for self defense and sell its technology based on its own policies.

Japan's intentions in relation to nuclear arms are also a cause for concern. Japan already has the wealth and the technology needed to develop a nuclear program rapidly. The powers of Northeast Asia fear that a continued U.S. withdrawal of its military power and nuclear umbrella will give Japan the reason she needs to develop a nuclear program. Without the U.S., Japan is surrounded by nuclear China, Russia, North Korea and in the future, possibly South Korea or a unified Korea.

Japan is concerned about North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because of the possibility that North Korea would use nuclear weapons against the South. Japan also fears that South Korea will develop nuclear weapons as a counter to the North. These two possibilities could cause Japan to arm herself with nuclear weapons. (Izumi, 1993, p. 1)

The breakup of the former Soviet Union adds to the concern over nuclear proliferation. The former Soviet republics urgently need cash and foreign exchange. This need could lead them to sell nuclear technology in exchange for currency. China fears that such exchanges, coupled with the nuclear successor states, will lead to the emergence of an Islamic bloc of nuclear armed nations bordering China. (Glaser, 1993, pp. 254-255)

5. Territorial Disputes

Continuing territorial disputes between the nations of the region constitute the last of the unresolved problems complicating the quest for multilateral cooperative security. Large scale war along the heavily armed Sino-Soviet border has become less probable. China and Russia's eastern border

dispute was largely resolved by the 15 May, 1991, Russia-Chinese Border Accord. The accord covered the Mongolian-Russian-Chinese border to the sea. Russia obtained half of the 1845 islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers. However, the agreement left the future status of several islands around Khabarovsk undetermined and in Russian hands pending further negotiations. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 504)

More important for regional stability are the negotiations for large-scale force reductions, Confidence Building Measures (CBM's) and other transparency measures to build a basis for trust and enhance border security for both nations. In December 1992, President Yeltsin and President Yang Shang Kun committed the two nations to the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border region. They also agreed to reach a final border troop level by the end of 1994. Meanwhile it was agreed that the remaining troops were to adopt an "unambiguously defensive structure." (Glaser, 1993, p. 256)

The normalization of Sino-Russian relations and the progress made toward reducing border tensions is promising. The probability of Sino-Russian conflict is low. Both countries are focusing on domestic reform and are doing their utmost to persevere regional stability. However, the large amount of troops remaining on the border, the possibility of disagreement concerning the remaining Amur/Ussurri islands, discord over the movement of Russian arms from Western Europe and cross border difficulties in Central Asia remain long-term concerns for Sino-Russian relations.

Both Russia and China have agreed to work together to preserve stability in Central Asia. The Central Asian borders of China, Russia and the newly independent republics are penetrated by cross border religious and cultural identities and unrest. Russia and China are both disturbed by the growth of Islamic extremism. Central Asia's economic difficulties

provide fertile ground for conventional and nuclear weapons (Kazakhstan is already a nuclear state) from the Middle East through South Asia (Ziegler, 1994, p. 533).

"The dispute over the Northern Territories is another example of the difficulty of liquidating Cold War debts." (Bracken, 1993, p. 2) Removing Russian troops from Germany was easier than removing them from small islands of little strategic significance (Bracken, 1993, p. 3). Japan's position on the resolution of this and other disputes make regional security cooperation difficult. Japan insists upon the resolution of territorial claims with China and Russia "as a prerequisite to progress on all major foreign policy matters." (Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 4)

Other territorial disputes that lay dormant during the Cold War have taken on greater meaning. These disputes include the friction between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoydao), the contention between China and Korea over the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Yellow Sea, and the friction between Japan and South Korea over Liancourt Rock (Takeshima or Tok-do).

III. SECURITY VIEWS OF CHINA, RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA

Each of these countries has its own unique views and concerns about its position in post-Cold War Northeast Asia. These will be examined below. However, the following is a summary of common views they share about the contemporary security environment in Northeast Asia.

- Failure of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Socialist regimes of Eastern Europe revealed the stark reality that the economic systems of the former Leninist nations were a failure. Russia and North Korea were left behind by the Asian economic boom and China is a relative latecomer with a long road ahead. Recognizing this fact, the governments of China, Russia and North Korea have focused on economic integration as a means of bolstering their economies and stabilizing their political systems.

- The Korean Peninsula remains a significant key to regional stability.

Both China and Russia recognize the potential for armed conflict that still exists on the Korean Peninsula. Both nations have engaged in economic cooperation directly with North Korea and their former adversaries in trying to promote an environment conducive to the resolution of the continued standoff in Korea.

- The sole reliance on military power is an anachronistic means for coping with the problems of the new security environment.

New modes must be developed to solve the problems threatening regional stability. Each of these nations is in the process of formulating new strategies aimed at cooperating

with their former adversaries in the interest of regional stability, a condition necessary for their political survival. China and Russia are also joining their Asian neighbors in participating in regional forums for the same purpose.

- Challenge posed by the technology revolution.

The technology revolution will continue to advance to new levels through the end of the century and into the next. The former Leninist nations must keep up with these advances or they will find themselves in a very difficult position, economically and militarily.

A. CHINA

Three events of 1989 signaled the advent of the post-Cold War security situation in Northeast Asia. (Grant, 1993, p. 3)

1. The Soviet Union and the PRC normalized relations, releasing the PRC from preoccupation with its northern borders and its need to rely on good relations with the U.S. to counter Soviet hegemony.
2. Sino-U.S. relations deteriorated in the wake of Tiananmen Square.
3. The U.S. recognized a decreased threat to its Asian interests and announced it phased drawdown of military forces in the region.

The Soviet-U.S.-China strategic triangle has collapsed. China can no longer exploit the differences between the two superpowers to its advantage. The passing of "balance and check" has caused China to adopt a policy of integrating itself more closely into the economic and security framework of the Asia-Pacific.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, some Chinese security analysts believed that security planning would be focused on the U.S. as the next great threat to China's security. These analysts believed

that the U.S. would make China the major target of its post-Cold War grand strategy. Most analysts argue that this view was too simplistic. They believe that China's security must be analyzed by considering the overall conditions of the post-Cold War security environment. (Chen, 1993, pp. 238-240)

1. China's Security Concerns and Grand Strategy

China has developed a grand strategy that capitalizes on the relative stability of Northeast Asia and the growing interdependence of Asian economics to ensure China's economic modernization moves forward at a rapid pace. Despite its security concerns, China is more secure now than any time since 1949.

There is no evident danger of a major attack by any adversary, and the prospect of a world war, or major regional conflict that might threaten China's security, is remote. (Xu, 1994, p. 28)

The likelihood of military conflict between China and the Soviet Union was dramatically reduced in the late 1980's. The border dispute between Russia and China has been largely reduced and both sides have made significant progress in decreasing the amount of troops on either side. Although problems remain, China is "confident that Moscow now harbors no hostile intent toward China...." (Glaser, 1993, p. 255)

China's security concerns are now focused inward on economic modernization.

The absence of an imminent military threat has provided China with a protracted period during which it is free to pursue economic development without major external distractions. (Glaser, 1993, p. 253)

This focus has been conditioned by the challenge of global economic and technological advancement and the prospect of falling further behind the advanced industrial nations. The

performance of western style weapons in the Gulf War underlined the technological backwardness of China and its military. The 1991 World Bank Report listed China ninth in the world in terms of gross domestic product. However, in terms of per capita national product, the 1990 World Bank Report listed China 96th in the world. (Xu, 1994, p. 28) China's economy has achieved 12% and 13% growth rates in the last two years but it is still a developing country.

Establishing a powerful and modern economy is essential to the survival of China's burgeoning population and for domestic stability. It is also vital to enhancing China's "comprehensive national power" and securing its rightful place as a regional and global power. The key to this objective is to foster a stable international environment conducive to the success of economic reform.

China articulated its focus on internal and economic modernization at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 1992. The CPC calls its long term strategy "one center and two main points." "One center" refers to "modernizing as fast as possible." Economic reform at "full speed ahead" and opening relations with the outside world, are the "two main points." (Buss, 1994, p. 6; Hu, 1993, p. 119)

Modernization is to proceed under the direction of the Communist Party and its "Four Cardinal Principles." The principles are: (Buss, 1994, p. 4)

- Follow the Socialist Road (socialism with Chinese characteristics).
- Preserve the People's Democratic Dictatorship.
- Follow the leadership of the Communist Party.
- Honor the thought of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong.

The events of 1991 shocked China and created a crisis of confidence among many intellectuals, students and some

officials. Although the post-Cold War political events had little impact on the peasant population, making up 70% of the population, the effects of the shock must be guarded against (Chen, 1993, p. 238). There is the possibility that an anti-socialism movement could take a larger hold in China and advocate following the Russian/Eastern Europe model of reform. This would have ominous consequences for the current regime and possibly throw China's own efforts at internal reform into chaos. Economic modernization without political reform will be a difficult balancing act. China must pursue peaceful evolution with a gradual transformation of the existing political structures, avoiding an explosive overthrow of these structures.

For now the problems of political reform in Russia have focused the nation on "Deng thought." The economic and social problems that Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics have experienced on the road to open markets and democratic reform, have worried the Chinese people. They are now watching Yeltsin's "'shock therapy' with a skeptical eye, thinking that China's reform may succeed and preferring to wait and see and try." (Chen, 1993, p. 240) Some discomfort and displacement is not worth the chaos the Chinese observe in Russia. Chinese reformers have placed their hopes in Deng Xiaoping's modernization program of establishing "socialism with Chinese characteristics." This wait and see attitude has bought time and stability that this approach will need to work.

China's goal of quadrupling its GNP by the year 2050 will be difficult enough (Xu, 1994, p. 27). It will require an average growth rate of about 9% over the next five to six decades. A drastic change in the political climate could lead to chaos and upset the fragile balance of the "one center" and the "two main points." China intends to benefit from world economic competition. No major economic power can compete for

long without a major stake in China's huge market and potential for investment. (Chen, 1993, 239)

Chinese analysts realize that economic development can only be achieved in a peaceful international environment. China's foreign policy strategy of "good neighborly relations" is aimed at increasing political dialogue and economic interdependence. Outside economic investment is critical to developing China's economy. China works hard to maintain good ties with the U.S. and the West. China is also expanding its economic ties to its close neighbors in Asia. Taiwan and Hong Kong are China's first and second largest trading partners and Hong Kong is the largest source of direct investment in China. Bilateral trade with South Korea was expected to reach \$13 billion in 1993, making China South Korea's third largest trading partner behind the United States and Japan. (Grant, 1994, p. 66)

China's foreign policy strategy also stresses better political and economic relations "with states with which Beijing has territorial disputes and other differences that could erupt into military conflict." (Glaser, 1993, p. 268) China established normal diplomatic relations with South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia and the newly independent Central Asian nations in 1992. China also hosted the Japanese emperor, President Yeltsin, the South Korean president and eleven presidents or prime ministers of neighboring nations throughout 1992.

Despite its foreign policy of good neighborly relations and interdependence, there are long term challenges that could destabilize China's security environment and the pursuit of economic modernization. These challenges are summarized below.

- America's reluctance to change its Cold War attitude toward China and its attempt to impose its own concept of democracy and human rights on China.

One reason for the lack of change in U.S. policy toward China is that the U.S. is bogged down by domestic economic issues, the Middle East peace process, Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti. The U.S. has just not taken the time to reevaluate objectively its interests and policy in China. The other issues are important but a nation with 20% of the worlds population, nuclear weapons, and a potential strategic partner in Northeast Asia warrants a higher priority than it is currently afforded.

A second reason for China's concern is the way that the U.S. handles its relations with China. The rhetoric of A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim, mentioned earlier, is an example. Another example was mentioned in Winston Lords "Malaise" memo of April 1994. According to Mr. Lord, U.S.-China relations are suffering from "a plethora of problems which Asians perceive as caused by hostile unilateral actions. These are creating a sense of resentment and apprehension in our relations" with China and Asia as a whole (U.S. Dept. of State, 1994, p. 2). Mr. Lord continues:

Central to this malaise are the problems in our two principal Asian relationships--Japan and China. We view these as arising from the unwillingness of Japan and China to conform their policies to international norms. Asians, and other view us as placating domestic interest groups and criticize us for tactics that destabilize relationships which are central to the region's peace and prosperity. (U.S. Dept. of State, 1994, p. 1)

The weakness in American strategy is that America no longer has the power to fulfill its goal of being the leader of the new world order. The U.S. GNP has dropped from nearly half the world GNP at the end of World War I to about one fourth in 1990. The U.S. has moved from being the world's largest creditor nation to the worlds largest debtor. U.S. attempts to import "democracy" and "human rights" to third

world nations have largely failed. The U.S. is unable to lead its longtime NATO allies in finding a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia and the civil wars in Eastern Europe. (Buss, 1994, pp. 23-25)

It is obvious that there are many differences between the U.S. and China. However, there are many areas of common interest on which to build better relations. Both nations want to prevent nuclear proliferation, prevent arms races, interdict international drug trafficking, and protect the environment. Instead of basing relations on changes in ideology, the U.S. and China should work toward cooperation based on the shared goals of economic prosperity and regional stability in Northeast Asia and elsewhere.

- The future regional and global role of Japan.

Most Chinese analysts do not expect Japan to break with the U.S. and develop an independent military capability within this century (Glaser, 1993, p. 257). But, China resents the American focus on the U.S.-Japan alliance as the "linchpin of American policy in the Pacific." (Buss, 1994, p. 44) China welcomes the U.S.-Japan alliance as long as it does not overpower China's position and as long as it keeps Japan tied to the United States (Buss, 1994, p. 45).

Beijing views Japan as its main rival for political influence in Northeast Asia in the next century and is wary of Japanese ambitions to play a greater global and regional security role.

Its increasing political role in peacekeeping operations, and its impending permanent membership in the UN Security Council-all of which increase its political influence and...military activities outside its borders...all portend a more active diplomatic and military role for Japan on the global and regional stage. (Song, 1993, p. 7)

The perception of a strong Japan combined with a reduced U.S. defense presence perpetuates anxieties about Japan's role in regional security. Japan is a welcome source of investment but an ultra-nationalistic and independently rearmed Japan would be a nightmare for China.

Chinese analysts see disturbing trends in Japan's military buildup despite a U.S. presence and a military budget that already ranks second in the world. Japan's modern naval self defense force ranks seventh in the world in size and is arguably the most capable in Northeast Asia. The MSDF conducts operations out to 1,000 nautical miles of Japan, encompassing the international shipping lanes of Northeast Asia. (Ji, 1994, p. 4; Morgan, 1994, p. 29)

- Uncertainty about economic and political developments in Russia and Central Asia.

China's general confidence about its current security environment is based on the virtual disappearance of the military threat from the former Soviet Union. By the end of the 1980's, fundamental changes in Soviet foreign and military policy drastically reduced the likelihood of military conflict between China and the Soviet Union. This set the stage for the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations at the Deng-Gorbachev summit of May 1989.

China's security was further enhanced with the collapse of the strategic triangle between China, the United States and the Soviet Union. These events precipitated negotiations concerning border disputes and the withdrawal of troops deployed along the Sino-Soviet border. China has been encouraged by these negotiations and is now confident that Moscow no longer harbors hostile intent toward China (Grant, 1994, p. 60; Glaser, 1993, p. 252).

Despite the general level of economic and political chaos in Russia, some Chinese analysts remain concerned about

Russian economic resurgence. Greater economic might could help Russia realize expansionist ambitions and restore superpower status or at least place Russia in direct economic competition with China. Most important, Russian economic prosperity could cause the people of China to demand to follow the same democratization/modernization path. This would pose a direct threat to the Chinese Communist regime.

An important consideration in Sino-Russian relations is the future of the Central Asian nations. Beijing considers Central Asia the most uncertain and potentially unstable region of the world. This view has been moderated by the establishment of diplomatic relations. (Glaser, 1993, p. 254) However, China continues to fear Islamic fundamentalism and Pan Turkism and the appeal such movements may foster among the forces of ethnic separatism in northwestern China. China dispatched 200,000 troops to Xinjiang in 1990 to prevent just such an ethnic movement from succeeding (Galeotti, 1994, 338). Far graver is the potential emergence of a bloc of ultra nationalistic Islamic nations armed with nuclear weapons. This causes China concern over Kazakhstan's nuclear program. (Glaser, 1993, p. 255; Walsh, 1993, p. 272)

China, in cooperation with Russia, has adopted the interdependence approach to solving this security concern. Stressing interdependence and relying on the influence of China's economic boom, China hopes to shape the focus of Central Asia and to quell subversive trans-border ethnic groups. China has established "good neighborly relations" with each of the Central Asian nations. Both Moscow and Beijing favor economic development in the newly independent nations to enhance political stability in the region. Premier Li Peng advocated stronger political and economic ties with China's Central Asian neighbors during an April 1994 trip. A border agreement was also concluded with Kazakhstan and Li Peng secured assurances of support from Uzbekistan,

Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan for China's efforts to quash Uighur separatism. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 533)

- Nuclear developments in the Korean Peninsula.

China is inherently threatened by the possibility of nuclear weapons in neighboring North Korea. The normalization of relations between Seoul and Beijing weakened China's relationship with North Korea. North Korea's actions regarding the nuclear issue have further strained relations. The Chinese publicly maintain that North Korea does not have the capability to manufacture nuclear arms. However, they were "taken aback" by evidence uncovered by IAEA inspectors and were not consulted when North Korea withdrew from the NPT. (Grant, 1994, p. 61)

In the long-term, China is concerned about a reunified, economically powerful and nuclear capable Korea. A unified nation may seek to reclaim Chinese territory bordering Korea that is traditionally considered by both North and South as the birthplace of Korean civilization (Glaser, 1993, p. 262). Furthermore, a unified and nuclear Korea may provide the impetus Japan needs to develop a nuclear arsenal of its own.

2. China's View of Multilateral Cooperation

China has traditionally been cautious about cooperative security arrangements and arms control agreements. China is naturally sensitive to any collective security or cooperative security mechanisms instituted by the major powers. Historically, China has suffered devastation and semi-colonialism at the hands of neighboring Japan and major Western powers during the last two centuries. During the Cold War she was under constant threat by either of the superpowers. (Ji, 1994, p. 16)

China has shown more interest in regional economic and security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Qian

Qichen attended the APEC meetings in Seoul in 1991 and in Seattle in 1993. China is an observer member of ASEAN and is a participant in the new ASEAN Regional Forum established in July 1993. The shift in China's policy toward regional multilateral cooperative security was demonstrated by Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqui's March 1992 speech in which he supported the gradual establishment of

subregional, and regional multinational and multilayered security dialogue mechanism so as to hold consultation on issues...and to strengthen the exchange of confidence. (Quoted in Ji, 1994, p. 9)

China's policy toward multilateral cooperation has experienced a positive shift and Chinese policy makers have made statements on the type of mechanism they would like to see established. Policy makers desire the U.S. to continue to play a brokering role in Northeast Asia but, they are not simply willing to engage in a new world order based on ideology. China's leaders have laid down the following principles for the type of cooperative security arrangement in which they will participate. They were expressed by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in March and August 1992, and are known as the "Five Principles of Coexistence." (Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 6; Hu, 1993, p. 121)

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity: No foreign troops based abroad.
2. Mutual nonaggression: Disputes should be settled peacefully and more confidence building measures should be developed including a no first-use nuclear policy.
3. Noninterference in one another's internal affairs: Cooperation should be based on common interests and not on the basis of a common social system, ideology or values.
4. Equality and mutual benefit: Any mechanism should not be directed at another country and should work to the

benefit of all nations involved. All participants must have equal rights and no single power should have predominant control.

5. Peaceful coexistence: Each nation should cooperate to enhance an environment conducive to the economic development of all involved.

B. RUSSIA

There are absolutely no reasons for excluding Russia in addressing security concerns in Northeast Asia. Physically Russia has as much right to be included in Northeast Asian affairs as the U.S. or Canada. Russia shares an extensive common border with China and a much smaller border with North Korea. Japan and Russia both border the strategic Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. The Russian Far East is more closely linked with the economics of Northeast Asia than of Europe and perhaps even European Russia.

Politically and economically, Russia's role is important for Northeast Asian nations. China takes Russia seriously because of their 4,500-mile common border, their substantial cross border trade, and their common interests in Central Asia. Russia has also become an important source of weapons for China's defense modernization. The Kurile Islands issue ensures that Russia will remain an important player in Japanese security considerations. Russia demonstrates its concern for enhancing stability in Northeast Asia through its attempts to influence events on the Korean Peninsula.

Of course there are challenges to Russia's integration into Northeast Asia. The most obvious is cultural. Northeast Asian nations are Confucian and Buddhist (with national variations) while Russia is Orthodox Christian. Asian nations as a whole are noted for their strong work ethic and efficient business skills, Russians are not known for either. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 542)

Russia has recognized the integrationist trend of world economics but post-Cold War Russia still looks to the West more than Northeast Asia to finance its economic and political reform. Russia's actions in Asia are often marked by arrogance and ambivalence, much akin to the American style malaise noted by Winston Lord, further undermining Russia's already shaky position in Asia. However, Russia's problem with integrating into Northeast Asia is much deeper than simple policy malaise (Ziegler, 1994, p. 542).

Russia will not be taken seriously in the Asian-Pacific until its political crisis, economic freefall, massive inflation and national and regional demands for autonomy have been dealt with. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 542)

It is in the realm of much needed economic relations in which Russia is struggling to integrate itself into Northeast Asia. Trade between the former Soviet Union and the entire Asian-Pacific region in 1991 was just under \$20 billion, in 1992 it declined to \$9.5 billion as Russia's economic performance spiraled downward. This latter figure equates to about one quarter the size of China trade with the U.S. This figure denotes the lack of an assertive Russian presence in the Asian economy. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 536)

Russia has expressed a desire to join the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum but, due to a three-year moratorium enacted by member nations determined to limit membership to the more dynamic regional economies, Russia remains on the sidelines of Asia's premier multilateral economic organization. "It is an implicit commentary on Russia's economic status that Malaysia, tiny Brunei, and the

anemic Philippines are included in APEC and Russia is not." (Ziegler, 1994, p. 541)⁴

There are issues dividing Russia from Northeast Asia and arguments for further integrating Russia economically and politically in Northeast Asia. Russia must continue to deal with Western security challenges such as Ukrainian nuclear ambitions and the status of her citizens in the Baltic Republics. However, "the basic challenge in terms of real threats as well as chances to approbate Russia's ability to cooperate with the U.S. ...lie in [Northeast Asia]." (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 299)

No matter how much Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev is personally committed to 'Euro-Atlantic'-thinking, there are two hard facts he is unable to ignore: never since the Middle Ages has Russia's political space been so distant from Atlantic Europe, and never were Russia's national interests so strongly tied with the challenging East. (Bogaturov, 1993, pp. 298-299)

1. Russia's Security Concerns and Grand Strategy in Northeast Asia

Russia, like China, faces no real military threat for perhaps the first time in the Twentieth Century. Russia has now focused on internal political and economic reform. Her military defense, though still formidable in numbers and equipment, has largely been reduced to reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Currently there are two dominant views of Northeast Asia held by Russian political decision makers. The first is based on military considerations. This view sees the U.S.-Japan alliance as a threat and renounces cooperation with Japan in

⁴Another example of Russia's struggle to integrate into Asia is her continued status as an observer to the ASEAN PMC and her lack of contact with the Asian Development Bank. (Ziegler, 1994, pp. 539-540)

settling the Kurile Islands dispute. It favors a military alliance with China to balance the U.S. and Japan and dismisses the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation unless it encourages Japan to develop a nuclear capability. The second view is based on economic integration. The nations of Northeast Asia are potential economic partners. Russia should cultivate good relations with them, especially with Japan and China, to integrate itself into Northeast Asia's dynamic economy. Integration will in turn help fund Russia's own economic reform. This view also stresses a more active role in multilateral efforts aimed at reducing nuclear and missile proliferation, especially in North Korea. (Blank, 1994, p. 1)

Some Russian analysts argue that the first view currently holds sway in Russian policy circles due to the rise of nationalist political forces within Russia (Blank, 1994, pp. 1-7). I believe the evidence shows that Russia has made significant progress in following the second path, while experiencing some serious roadblocks, notably with Japan.

Starting in the Brezhnev era, Russia cultivated strategic relations with India and Third World Asian nations in an attempt to supplant western influence in Realpolitik balance-of-power terms. During the Gorbachev era the Soviet Union began to withdraw support from India and its "socialist allies," Vietnam and North Korea. Beginning with Gorbachev's "new thinking" policy, outlined in his July 1986 Vladivostok speech, the Soviet Union began to move toward improving its relations with China, Japan and South Korea. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has focused its interests in Asia even more narrowly toward Northeast Asia. Russia must cooperate with the major nations and economies of this region if it expects to fulfill its national security goals. Relations with China, Japan and South Korea, the economic need to develop the Far East and multilateral cooperative security

have been given first place priority in Russia's Asia policy. (Buszynski, 1993, pp. 486-489; Chace, 1992, p. 614)

Russia's post-Cold War regional and global national interests and foreign policy goals address security in territorial and economic terms and downplay the role of military power as the sole means for ensuring regional stability. They are spelled out in the "Fundamentals of the Foreign-Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," approved by President Yeltsin in April 1993. (Bunin, 1993, pp. 2-4)

- Territorial- protecting the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

Russia's foremost security goal is to preserve its national identity and territorial integrity. This includes securing its border and quelling separatist trends in Siberia and the Far East.

- Economic- to develop normal relations and mutually beneficial trade and economic ties globally and especially with Russia's neighbors in the Far East.

Moscow's leadership regards economic growth as the best way of ensuring Russian security in an environment where no major or direct external threats have been identified...specific or narrow security concerns relating to Russia's far eastern borders have been subsumed beneath the more urgent economic priority. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 492)

Economic growth must come through cooperation with other nations. Economic cooperation includes learning from the experience of Northeast Asia's dynamic economies, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and including China. "China's experience of economic reform providing for gradual 'marketization' cannot be overestimated." (Bunin, 1993, p. 3) Security in the Russian Far East is dependent on economic growth and Russia does not visualize development of this region without the cooperation of her Northeast Asian neighbors (Bunin, 1993, p. 4).

Russia needs the economic and moral support of the international community to meet its fundamental security interests. It also needs broad based business cooperation and the free flow of advanced technology to assist in the demilitarization of the Russian economy. Simultaneously the militarized nature of the Russian economy presents a unique challenge. Due to the military nature of its civilian economy, Russia's main export is defense equipment. Russia has little in terms of industrial products to offer to the markets of Northeast Asia. It will be difficult to encourage the trade relationships needed to revitalize its economy strictly on an arms sales basis. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 498)

- Regional Stability- help create a stable regional environment conducive to economic and political reform.

During the Cold War the Soviet Union was focused on the threat of a U.S. nuclear strike. Soviet analysts tended to overlook regional threats. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia is very much concerned with uncertainties on its borders and frontiers with China, North Korea, Mongolia Kazakhstan and Japan. (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 303) The former Soviet Union relied upon military power to deter these threats and provide for the defense of the border region but, Russian economic deterioration has undermined the basis of a purely military approach to security issues (Buszynski, 1993, p. 500).

An example of the state of the military is the lack of financial capacity to maintain the Russian Pacific fleet. The effect of the reduction in military spending has "been felt in the Pacific fleet with reports of vessels in a critical condition in the absence of regular maintenance as well as fuel shortages." (Buszynski, 1993, p. 500) Furthermore, President Yeltsin in 1992 declared major reduction in the Pacific Fleet and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from all

vessels and an eventual stop to building nuclear weapons. Because of these developments the military high command has endorsed the political management of Russia's security concerns through bilateral and multilateral economic and political cooperation. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 500; Bogaturov, 1993, p. 303)

Bilaterally, the old Soviet Union dealt primarily with China. The new Russia is equally concerned with China. The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations between 1989-91, was a major breakthrough for both nations and a positive legacy for the Russian Federation. Tension between the two former rivals were further decreased by the Russian-China Border Accord of 1991 and the Joint Memorandum of 1992. In the latter the two nations agreed to the phased reduction of military forces on their mutual border to purely defensive levels by the year 2000. President Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in 1992 and Foreign Minister Kozyrev's trip in January 1994, have also contributed to substantial progress in Russian-Chinese relations. Through these developments Russian and China have "agreed to disagree" over ideological differences and to find common ground and common interests on which to cooperate. (Bunin, 1993, pp. 7-8; Ivanov, 1992, p. 74)

The Joint Declaration adopted during Yeltsin's 1992 visit to Beijing explains the basis for future relations between Russian and the PRC. (Bunin, 1993, pp. 7-9; Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 4) The declaration states:

- The two nations "see one another as friendly states who would develop good-neighborly relations of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation." (Bunin, 1993, p. 7)
- Confirms the commitment by both nations to a no first use nuclear policy and a no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and nuclear-free zones.

- That neither country will seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific and both nations dedicate themselves to act against hegemony and policies of force.
- That "the 'two sides shall take efforts for the purpose of promoting peace, security stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. They will cooperate to realize the better understanding and economic development in Northeast Asia.'" (Bunin, 1993, p. 9)
- Neither nation will participate in political-military alliances directed against each other.

Besides bilaterally enhancing their own security, Russia is cooperating with China to cultivate relations with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan to prevent an anti-Russian Islamic group of nations from forming along Russia's southern border.

Yeltsin and Kozyrev's visits to Beijing also expanded Sino-Russian economic cooperation, including plans for Chinese participation in developing Siberia and the Far East, the projected construction of a nuclear reactor in China, and other cooperative projects. In 1992, Sino-Russian trade was officially \$5.85 billion rising to \$7.7 billion in 1993. "The economic bright spot for Russia in Asia has been China." (Ziegler, 1994, p. 536)

A significant amount of Russia's exports to China consists of Su-27 and Su-31 aircraft and S-300 surface-to-air missiles. In view of the Russian reliance upon the export of military hardware, China has become an important customer since China has been denied access to western arms markets. Over 80% of all Russian-Chinese trade is cross border trade between northern China and the Russian Far East. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 536) The high rate of growth in cross border trade in this region is a testimony to the reduced economic ties between European and Far Eastern Russia and the Far East's dependence on China for basic consumer goods (Buszynski, 1993, pp. 498-499).

Paradoxically, economic cooperation has led to some friction between Russia and China in the Far East. The economic underdevelopment and sparse population of the Far East have encouraged "economic penetration" by Chinese. Now the Far East is swamped with economic and consumer goods from China. Russian citizens in the Far East reportedly resent shoddy Chinese merchandise and questionable business practices and they believe the Chinese are behind much of the current crime wave. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 537)

Some Far East Russians see a gradually growing number of Chinese traders, smugglers and "average Chinese" streaming across the border. They are concerned that overpopulation pressures in China could produce a flood of migration across the border. Current estimates place 300,000 to one million Chinese in the Russian Far East. For now Beijing has promised to control the influx of Chinese entrepreneurs into Russia. (Ziegler, 1994, p. 537; Grant, 1994, p. 60)

The second nation with which the old Soviet Union dealt with was Japan. In contrast to Russo-Chinese relations, Russo-Japanese relations are the weak link in Russia's Northeast Asian relationships. The decline in trade between the two nations from a high in 1991 of \$6 billion to \$3.9 billion in 1993 reflects the stagnating relationship (Ziegler, 1994, p. 537). The basis for the poor relationship is the tension over the Kurile Islands dispute and the lack of a post-World War II peace treaty. These issues continue to frustrate efforts toward greater Russo-Japanese economic and political cooperation.

The Northern Territories dispute between Russia and Japan involves the occupation of the four islands of the Kurile chain and the strategic Catherine Strait. If Russia were to give up the two most important islands of Kunashir and Iturup, Japan would control this strategic strait. The strait is an important gateway into the Sea of Okhotsk, a major deployment

area for Russian SSBN's (Ji, 1993, p. 2). Moscow's leadership has been trying to normalize relations with Japan to entice technical aid and investment into the Russian economy (Buszynski, 1993, p. 696). However, internal politics and policies on both sides have prevented the two nations from resolving these issues and moving closer together.

On the Russian side, domestic opposition to any form of territorial concession has frustrated summit meetings planned between Moscow and Tokyo in September 1992 and April 1993. The opposition includes

a mighty regional lobby that refers to the economic validity of the disputed islands for the local economy and the terrible losses regional budgets would suffer were the territories transferred to Japan. (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 312)

When the two sides did finally meet in October 1993, Yeltsin's enemies tried to scuttle his position and the two sides failed to make progress on the dispute. What modest measure of goodwill that was achieved at the meeting was negated by the Russian navy's decision to continue to dump nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan.⁵ (Ziegler, 1993, p. 538)

The Russian public perceives that Japan's firmness on the issue is a result of Russian political and economic decline rather than a strategic military problem. They are not willing to make concessions from a position of national weakness (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 312). Similarly, the Russian foreign ministry is concerned that any appearance of capitulation to Japanese demands while Russia is weak may stimulate other territorial claims against Russia (Buszynski, 1993, p. 493).

⁵In his message to the Prime Minister of Japan, Boris Yeltsin said that Russia was "willing to see Japan as 'a partner and potential ally' bound by 'common and eternal human values.'" (Quoted in Bunin, 1993, p. 13)

Washington has urged Japan to aid Russia's move toward democracy in the interest of regional and world stability. But, Japan has been reluctant to pledge economic assistance without progress toward resolving the Kurile Islands issue (Ziegler, 1994, p. 537). The Japanese government did pledge \$1.82 billion in aid to Russia prior to the July 1993 G-7 summit in Tokyo. However, the official policy concerning the territorial dispute

insists that any emergency aid to Russia be distinguished from large-scale economic assistance...and should not undermine the principle of Japanese sovereignty over the disputed islands. (Buszyinski, 1993, p. 495)

Japan's refusal to delink the territorial issue and economic investment will make it difficult to resolve the strained relations between Russia and Japan.

Even if better relations do improve it does not necessarily follow that investment in Russia will rise appreciably. "Russia and Western observers...tended to overestimate Japanese interest in exploiting Russia's massive reserves of natural resources." (Ziegler, 1994, p. 537) Japanese companies perceive that the risks outweigh benefits in exploiting the Russian Far East. Furthermore, Japanese investment abroad has typically been directed toward politically stable countries with a technically proficient work force and a developed infrastructure. Russia has little to offer Japan in terms of stable investments. (Buszyinski, 1993, p. 496)

Like the other nations of Northeast Asia, Russia is concerned about Japan's future role in regional and world political and economic developments. Russia is interested in a continuation of the U.S.-Japan alliance as long as it is not aimed at Russia.

Russia prefers to see Tokyo well integrated in the U.S.-based security system as the improved Russo-American relations indirectly stabilize the troubled relationship between Tokyo and Moscow. (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 312)

It will be extremely difficult for Russia to become an active participant in Northeast Asia, much less the Asia-Pacific, affairs without normal relations with Japan. This is especially true economically. Current developments make it seem that normal relations will not be realized until the dispute over the post-World War II demarcation of the Kuriles is resolved. Meanwhile, the two nations should engage in multilateral cooperative security with their Northeast Asian neighbors. Cooperation on subregional and regional issues may strip the islands "of unnecessarily exaggerated meaning, and it would be much easier to solve it in due course and manner." (Bunin, 1993, p. 13)

Formerly, the Soviet Union assisted North Korea economically and militarily through oil and arms sales. Now, Russia is concerned about the North Korean nuclear question and the potential for conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Any negative action by North Korea could have an adverse effect on the Russian goal of revitalizing its Far Eastern region. Russia has continued to follow the Gorbachev policy of entering the U.S.-based security system in Northeast Asia through closer cooperation with American allies (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 308). This policy has met with only marginal success in Korea. Russia has lost virtually all of its leverage with North Korea by fostering a closer relationship with South Korea. Russian economic instability has hampered South Korean investment in Russia, further weakening Russian leverage on inter-Korean relations.

Gorbachev's policy of integrating the Soviet Union into Asia developed in the late 1980's caused an attitude shift toward North Korea. The Soviet Union shifted from a policy of

exclusive support for North Korea and pursued a balanced position between the two Koreas. Gorbachev hoped this would ensure Russian influence over Korean unification dialogue in the long term. Simultaneously, Soviet interest in economic reform was stimulated and South Korea became a potential trading partner and a model of development. As economics became central to Gorbachev's policy of integration, the importance of relations with "socialist allies" was downgraded. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 489)

Strategically, South Korea was intended to be an alternative to Japan as a source of economic assistance and as a means of pressuring Japan to offer concessions on the territorial dispute (Buszynski, 1993, p. 496). Diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul were established when Gorbachev and Roh Tae Woo met for the first time in San Francisco in June 1990, and through subsequent exchange visits in December 1990 and April 1991. The two nations signed a treaty in November 1992, proclaiming "common ideals of freedom, human rights and the principle of market economy" as a foundation for relations. (Bogaturrov, 1993, p. 308)

Russian-ROK relations continue to be friendly. Russia continues to look to South Korea because it is more technically sophisticated and has a larger supply of investment capital than China and South Korea is more committed to long term cooperation than Japan. South Korea along with North Korea is promoting a proposed natural gas pipeline for the Sakha Republic through North Korea. South Korea has been willing to aid Russia in its defense conversion. Trade with Russia in 1993 was \$1.57 billion compared to the 1991 total figure of \$1.2 billion with all of the former Soviet Union. However, while South Korea recognizes the potential for trade and investment in Russia they are limited by the Russian economy and Moscow's inability to repay its debts to Seoul. In December 1993, Seoul froze

half of a remaining \$3 billion loan due to poor Russian credit. (Lee and Sohn, 1994, p. 8; Ziegler, 1994, p. 539)

While Russia pursued economic relations with South Korea its relations with North Korea have been reduced to a climate of "barely disguised repugnance." (Buszynski, 1993, p. 489) North Korea's regime sympathized with the abortive August 1991 coup. The North Korean regime reminds the current Russian reformers of the type of communism that existed in Soviet society. A manifestation of the declining relationship is the reduction in military and economic aid to North Korea. Formerly North Korea was supplied with most of its arms and oil needs by Russia. Yeltsin has indicated that he is going to cut off all defense assistance and arms sales to North Korea. Russia has also reduced oil deliveries to 10% of their previous levels. By distancing herself from North Korea, Russia has also relinquished the two most important tools it possessed for bargaining leverage with North Korea. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 489)

The problem with Russia's policy is that she has lost the balance of interests she once sought on the Korean Peninsula. Her position with South Korea is limited by the Russian economy and Russia has disarmed herself in relation to North Korea. (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 311)

2. Russia's View of Multilateral Cooperation

Brezhnev floated a concept of an Asia-Pacific collective security system in 1969. This concept was not accepted by the U.S. and other regional nations. Asians did not want to get drawn into Soviet and Chinese differences and it was believed that it would dilute U.S. regional influence while enhancing the Soviet role. Thus, it would upset the bipolar Cold War balance of power in the Pacific. (Ji, 1994, p. 9; Kawanago, 1993, p. 1; Solomon, 1994, p. 249) A new approach to multilateral security and Soviet relations with Northeast Asia

was contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking," detente policy. This policy was outlined in Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of July 1986, in an interview with the Indonesian journal Merdeka in 1987 and in his speech at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988. (Wiseman, 1992, p. 43)

Gorbachev's policy was designed to improve the Soviet position in Asia through closer security and economic cooperation.

In each of these speeches Gorbachev sought to convey three essential messages: that the Soviet Union was and would remain an Asian-Pacific power of the first rank; that Moscow was eager, on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual advantage, to expand relations with friends and to repair relations with adversaries; and that conditions were propitious for a negotiated end to all regional conflicts and an easing of the areawide military confrontation. (Blacker, 1990, p. 3)

The Vladivostok speech called for a reduction in the size of the navies in the Pacific Ocean, general arms reductions in Asia and increased confidence building measures in the region. Gorbachev also advocated a regional forum modeled on the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) consisting of all Asian maritime nations. The Krasnoyarsk speech called for six nation talks on lowering military tensions in Northeast Asia and for a higher security mechanism for all of Asia composed of the U.S., China and the Soviet Union. (Chace, 1992, pp. 92-93; Wiseman, 1992, p. 43)

Andrew Mack, head of the Department of International Relations at The Australian National University, lists three reasons why Gorbachev's proposals received little support from Washington and pro-Western states (Mack, 1992, p. 22):

1. "Both Washington and the pro-Western regional states believed that the U.S. military superiority was the best guarantee of security in the region....That

superiority was an established fact and was unlikely to be challenged since the Soviet economy was moving into crisis. The Soviet Agenda for Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (CSBM's) was clearly designed to reduce U.S. regional maritime military superiority."

2. "The fact that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were all, to a greater or lesser degree, dependent on the United States for their security, meant that it was unlikely they would have challenged Washington's opposition to Moscow's overtures...."
3. "The particular bilateral relations which Northeast Asian states had with Moscow were a further complication. The People's Republic of China had never demonstrated much interest in the naval confidence-building proposals that were high on the Soviet agenda, while the Sino/Soviet territorial disputes, which were important for Beijing, were clearly best handled on a bilateral basis. Seoul had been antagonistic towards Moscow because of Soviet support for the DPRK; while Tokyo had made improvement in Soviet/Japanese relations contingent on the resolution of the so-called 'Northern Territories' issue."

Yeltsin's proposals do not seem to have been met with very much enthusiasm either. The evidence shows that most security issues between Russian and her neighbors are resolved on a bilateral basis. During a speech to the South Korean National Assembly in November 1992, President Yeltsin introduced proposals geared toward stabilizing Northeast Asia. These proposals included (Bunin, 1993, p. 17; Buszynski, 1993, p. 501):

- Building multilateral mechanisms at the regional and sub-regional level on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
- To work toward resolving military confrontation, prevent an arms race and reduce military spending in Northeast Asia.

- To build a regional center for strategic studies that would use the defense budgets and military doctrines of each nation to work toward greater transparency.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev made similar statement during trips to Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo. He specifically promoted the idea of strategic and arms reduction talks involving the U.S., Japan and China, and proposed multilateral negotiations on the topics of the territorial dispute with Japan and North Korea's nuclear program. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 501)

Gorbachev's "multilateralism" differs from that promoted by Yeltsin, though both sets of proposal have some points in common. Gorbachev's policy required the cooperation primarily of the Northeast Asian nations for success so it was specifically targeted toward them. However, on a larger scale,

Gorbachev attempted to replicate the European experience with the Helsinki security framework in the Asia-Pacific, which was to embrace the entire Western Pacific and include all major security issues. [His proposal] reflected the global interest of the Soviet Union as a superpower and its inherent need to be assured of recognition by the West. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 500)

By contrast, Yeltsin's proposals have been limited specifically to Northeast Asia and are related to Russia's immediate security concerns and economic development. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 500)

Yeltsin's proposals did not develop from a position of Russian strength. They arose from the recognition that Russia must cooperate with her Asian neighbors in order to achieve her security goals in the Russian Far East and the Pacific, including closer cooperation with the United States. Economic revitalization and a search for a positive strategic role are the core of Russia's foreign policy in Northeast Asia. Russia remains militarily strong enough to defend her interests by

force, but her interests would be better served through political understanding, shared responsibility and cooperative engagement with her neighbors (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 315).

C. NORTH KOREA

The Korean Peninsula is the key to a stable Northeast Asia. The interests of four great powers - Russia, China, Japan and the United States - converge there. These nations, and the Koreans themselves, are concerned about the denuclearization of the peninsula and Korean reunification. Starting in the late 1980s, North Korea has been faced with four major foreign and domestic developments. These developments have shaped North Korea's security and nuclear development objectives. (Kim, 1994, pp. 283-286)

1. North Korea's Security Concerns and Grand Strategy

The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe drastically changed the diplomatic scene for North Korea. The triangular ties between Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing began to erode as a result of Russia and China's integration into the world order and Seoul's successful opening of diplomatic ties with Moscow and Beijing. Soviet relations with North Korea had already weakened because of the normalization of Soviet-ROK relations in 1990. Relations with Russia have continued to deteriorate. An anticommunist Russian state "has frankly revealed its sense of dislike for and even opposition to the [North Korean] regime." (Kim, 1994, p. 284) Diplomatic ties with former communist Eastern European nations were also weakened as more democratic governments took control and looked to the west for economic aid and diplomatic recognition. North Korea was further isolated when the ROK established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1992. Though China still attempts to maintain friendly relations with the North, its cooperation and expanding trade relationship with

South Korea has placed a damper on a once very close relationship.

These events have resulted in an uneven strategic balance on the peninsula in favor of South Korea.

The South has security guarantees from the U.S. and friendly relations with Russia, a stable relationship with Japan, and finally, improving ties with China. The North, by contrast, has Chinese commitments, a morally devalued commitment from the non-existing Soviet Union and terse relations with Washington and Tokyo. (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 309)

Although Russia and China have accorded diplomatic relations with South Korea, Japan and the United States have yet grant cross recognition to North Korea. Japan and the United States still

regard North Korea as being 'the most isolated nation on earth; a belligerent nations that is supporting an extreme, absolute, communist dictatorship authority: and an unfriendly nation that threatens stability in the East Asian region.' (Quoted in Kim, 1994, p. 285)

North Korea has suffered a severe economic decline due to its isolation. Specialists on North Korea's economy use statistics to show that it will be difficult for North Korea to overcome its economic crisis without outside aid (Kim, 1994, p. 286).

Notably, figures show a significant shortage in fuel and electricity production. North Korea's oil consumption depends wholly on imports and its electricity needs are met by coal (45%) and hydroelectric generation (55%). North Korea is currently importing crude oil at 40% of its oil refinement capability. In 1991, when the Soviet Union began demanding market prices and hard currency payment in return for the oil it had been providing, North Korea's refinement industry

suffered a tremendous shock (Kim, 1994, p. 285; Jordan et al., 1993, p. 368).⁶ It is also producing only about half its coal needs and generating about 30% of its electricity needs. Factory output has declined to below 30% of capacity because of the energy shortage. The reduction of industrial and agricultural output has limited foreign trade. Foreign trade amounted to \$4.7 billion in 1991. In 1991 it was \$2.7 billion and \$2.6 billion in 1992 (Kim, 1994, pp. 287-288; Merrill, 1994, p. 15.)

The food shortage is the most obvious economic indicator to western visitors to North Korea. North Korea is reportedly producing 58% of its food needs. Because of the widespread shortage of food, the government launched a nationwide program to skip meals one day a month and in some areas a "two meals a day" program. (Kim, 1994, pp. 287-288; Merrill, 1994, p. 15.)

Another result of North Korea's isolation and the increasing prosperity of South Korea, has been a dramatic shift in the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.

The North feels threatened by Team Spirit and the enormous disparity in defence expenditures between the two Koreas. The resumption of Team Spirit in 1993 led to the suspension of dialogue between the two. Pyongyang thinks that Seoul is seeking conventional military superiority through its high levels of defence spending, which the North cannot match without undermining its economy. (Park, 1994, p. 90)

⁶North Korea is capable of refining 3.5 million metric tons a year. North Korea imported 2.65 million metric tons of oil in 1988 and only 1.1 million metric tons in 1992. (Kim, 1994, p. 287; Lee, 1993, p. 22) "North Korea used to import approximately 800,000 to 1,000,000,000 tons of oil from the former USSR until 1987, but has since declined to 640,000 tons in 1988, 506,000 tons in 1989, 410,000 in 1990, and 41,000 from January to July of 1991." (Lee, 1993, p. 22)

North Korea spends 20% of its gross national product (GNP) for defense, while the ROK spends about 3.8% of its GNP for defense (Jordan et al., 1993, p. 368). However, in absolute terms, North Korea's military expenditures amount to \$5 billion, about half South Korea's expenditure of \$10 billion. North Korea claims to be spending only \$1.1-\$2.1 billion, causing an even wider perception of imbalance. (Kim, 1994, p. 285) North Korea's economic plight will make it difficult to sustain even current levels of military spending. Furthermore, Russia and China have drastically reduced their supply of modern weapons to North Korea, while South Korea, with U.S. technology, is now able to produce its own array of sophisticated weapons.

North Korea harbors apprehensions that the United States is trying to cause the collapse of North Korea by playing upon its economic weakness. North Korea believes that the Soviet Union was induced into excessive military spending by the U.S. causing economic and political failure. North Korea suspects that the U.S. has tried to exercise this strategy by inducing North Korea to respond militarily to U.S. military activity on the peninsula, notably the joint U.S.-ROK Team Spirit exercise. (Kim, 1994, p. 286)

At first North Korea tried to adjust to the changes of the post-Cold War by increasing international diplomacy, economic interdependence and attempting to improve relations with South Korea (Jordan et al., 1993, pp. 368-369; Namkung, 1994, p. 138). Specifically, efforts were aimed at reducing tensions between the two Koreas, allaying suspicions concerning its nuclear weapons development program and reducing restrictions on international investment in North Korea.

North Korea's objective for its nuclear program was to ensure the survival of the current regime and North Korea's national existence (Suh, 1993, pp. 72,75).

It is surely more plausible...to see North Korea's nuclear program as insurance against the strategic developments of the past five years, which bore witness to a steady worsening of its position and could not but appear menacing to its political leadership. North Korea lost, and lost badly, the economic competition with the South. Its two protectors both turned away from it, the Soviet Union through implosion and China through its opening diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea. The loss of North Korea's strategic depth occurred simultaneously with the awesome demonstration of American power against a regime...with which North Korea was often paired in American thinking....The pursuit of nuclear weapons plausibly offered them protection they could get nowhere else, even if it carried the risk of inviting the very attack they most feared. (Hendrickson, 1994, p. 35)

The possession of nuclear weapons would accord North Korea certain advantages regardless of whether she used them. First, a nation possessing nuclear weapons receives dignified treatment by neighbors and adversaries. Secondly, its negotiation leverage will increase. North Korea, by threatening to develop nuclear weapons, was able to draw the U.S. into high level diplomatic talks concerning its nuclear program. Furthermore, North Korea has received important concessions in return for complying with U.S. wishes. (Izumi, 1993, p. 2; Kim, 1994, p. 293) These include the cancellation of Team Spirit, the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula, and, arguably, the conditions of the October 21, 1994 agreement.

By 1992, a serious North-South dialogue concerning unification was in progress, and Pyongyang had launched a major effort to secure better relations with Japan, the United States and other western powers. However, widespread suspicion that the North had not abandoned its longstanding goal of reuniting the peninsula by force if necessary and that it was developing nuclear weapons, prompted the international

community to remain skeptical of North Korea's intentions. (Jordan et al., 1993, pp. 368-369)

North Korea took a number of steps to allay the fears of the international community. In December 1991, both Koreas signed a pair of treaties. The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea (Basic Agreement) says that both sides agree to respect each other's political and social systems, to work toward a peace agreement to replace the 1953 armistice, and to exchange representative offices in Pyongyang and Seoul. The Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Joint Declaration) calls for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, renounces the development of nuclear arms, and forbids the two sides from possessing nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. (Park, 1994, pp. 81-82)

On January 7, 1992, North Korea finally signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safeguards Measures Agreement.⁷ Signing the safeguards agreement allows the IAEA to conduct inspections of nuclear facilities to obtain evidence that can determine whether a country has made nuclear weapons. North Korea's signing of the safeguards agreement assured the international community that it was being transparent about its nuclear program. (Kim, 1994, p. 276)

⁷North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. The NPT obligates signatories to sign the safeguards agreement within 18 months after signing the NPT. Pyongyang refused to sign the safeguard agreement until all U.S. nuclear weapons were withdrawn from South Korea. In September 1991, President Bush announced the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. This announcement opened the way for North Korea to sign the Joint Declaration with South Korea on December 31, 1991, and the safeguards agreement on January 7, 1992. (Kim, 1994, p. 276; Park, 1994, p. 80)

Throughout 1992 and 1993, the IAEA conducted six inspections of nuclear facilities in Yongbon. Additionally, the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) had begun negotiations on joint nuclear inspections. These events seemed to placate international concern. On this basis, South Korea and the United States announced the cancellation of the 1992 annual joint military "Team Spirit" exercise. North Korea had continuously protested that the exercise was aimed at provoking a nuclear war with North Korea. (Kim, 1994, p. 276)

By the end of 1992 international suspicions about the true nature of North Korea's nuclear program resurfaced. Rather than allay suspicion, the results of the IAEA inspection at Yongbon led the IAEA to conclude that North Korea was hiding significant nuclear developments. In particular, Pyongyang refused to allow the IAEA to conduct "special inspections" of two suspected nuclear fuel storage sites at Yongbon. Secondly, despite eight meetings, the South-North JNCC had yet to implement mutual inspections. Finally, the CIA and KGB both confirmed that North Korea was continuing its nuclear weapons program and had reached the stage that it could make a nuclear bomb. (Gordon, New York Times, October 21, 1994, p. A2; Park, 1994, p. 80; Suh, 1993, p. 70)

The IAEA issued an ultimatum at the beginning of 1993 declaring that North Korea must accept full inspections or face possible sanctions. South Korea and the United States conducted Team Spirit starting on March 9, 1993. Finally, after rebuffing IAEA demands for inspections of the two sites, North Korea declared a state of quasi-war and announced its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993. (Kim, 1994, p. 277; Park, 1994, p. 83) North Korea stated that it would not cooperate with the IAEA until "the American nuclear threat

ceased and the IAEA restored its impartiality." (Park, 1994, p. 82)

In April 1993, the IAEA accused the North of noncompliance and submitted a report to the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution that called upon North Korea to reconsider its nonproliferation obligations and to comply with the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korea subsequently agreed to "suspend the effectuation" of its withdrawal from the NPT once US-North Korean talks on the issue commenced. (Park, 1994, pp. 82-82)

A series of US-North Korean talks were held throughout 1993 and 1994 with little results until the agreement reached on October 21, 1994.⁸ In this agreement, North Korea agrees to halt work on two nuclear reactors and will not refuel its existing one at Yongbon in return for America's help in acquiring two South Korean built light-water reactors that produce lower levels of bomb making plutonium. The plutonium laden fuel rods already unloaded from Yongbon will be safely stored until the completion of the light-water reactors. If significant progress the U.S. may open liaison offices in North Korea and South Korea could loosen trade and investment restrictions in the North. (Economist, October 22, 1994, p. 19; Gordon, New York Times, October 21, 1994, p. A2)

As part of its policy of increasing economic interdependence, North Korea embarked on a series of economic reforms to open its economy to the outside world. In July 1991, North Korea requested that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) conduct feasibility studies for the development of the Tumen River area for joint international ventures. On December 28, 1991, North Korea reported that the

⁸For fuller description of the events leading up to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent events through March 31, 1994, see Kim, 1994, pp. 273-300; Park, 1994, pp. 78-91; and Merrill, 1994, pp. 10-18.

new free trade zone, encompassing 621 square kilometers surrounding the ports of Rajin and Songbong in the northeastern corner of the country, would be open to joint ventures and wholly foreign owned ventures.⁹ North Korea has been actively cooperating with South Korea, Mongolia, China and Russia on the Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP). In 1992, North Korea enacted three laws relating to foreign investment. These new laws provided more favorable conditions to foreign investors who complained about the restrictive terms of earlier laws. (Lee, 1993, pp. 23-24)

Contrary to "juche," or self-reliance, North Korea seems to recognize that its economic survival depends on trade and investment with its neighbors. John Whalen, Project Manager for TRADP believes the answer to North Korea's economic aspirations are summed up in

the positive and cooperative attitude the government of North Korea has shown in their participation in the TRADP; as opposed to their intransigence in other areas of intercourse with the outside world. (Whalen, 1994, p. 3)

Quoting Kim Jong U, Vice Minister for External Economic Affairs and Chairman of the Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation, Whalen reports on the depth of North Korean commitment to economic cooperation.

'Socialist markets have collapsed, there is only a Capitalist world market....What I want to say to the Western world and the U.S. is please don't close the door on us. We want to be out, to have economic cooperation.' (Quoted in Whalen, 1994, pp. 12-13)

⁹See speech given by John J. Whalen, Program Manager of TRADP, to The Korea Society/Los Angeles and Rand, Santa Monica, CA, May 26, 1994. This speech gives a brief explanation of the project itself and a series of examples of North Korean cooperation.

On the other hand, there are still doubts among North Korea's neighbors about her genuine intentions. Again, if the October 21 agreement works out, these concerns may subside. Even so, in the view of one writer

the elimination of the nuclear issue will not be sufficient enough to stimulate significant foreign joint venture to North Korea. Even though the South Korean government is very likely to approve inter-Korean economic cooperation once the nuclear issue is resolved, unless South Korean or other western firms can export those products produced in North Korea...to markets like the United States, there would be less incentive for South Korean or Japanese firms to invest in the North. Currently, the United States government prohibits any economic exchanges with North Korea on the basis of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), and, because of the rule of origin, South Korean firms will not be able to export products produced in North Korea to the United States market. (Lee, 1993, p. 25)

2. Prospects for future North Korean Multilateral Cooperation

The October 21, 1994 agreement represents a significant breakthrough despite arguments concerning its reliance on mutual suspicion, projections that it will take at least ten years before the entire process leading to the dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program will be completed.¹⁰ If both sides abide by the agreement, North Korea's potential to build nuclear weapons in the future will be severely reduced. In return North Korea will acquire more modern light-water

¹⁰See Gordon, New York Times, October 21, 1994, p. A2 and the Economist, October 22, 1994, pp. 19-20; these articles assert that North Korea is holding western aid hostage with its fuel rods, conversely, the U.S. is holding North Korea hostage with western aid which will disappear as soon as the North dismantles its nuclear program. Both articles also describe the specific four phase plan trading aid to build the light water reactors in exchange for IAEA inspections and eventual destruction of the Yongbon reactors.

reactors to help staunch its critical electrical power shortage. The agreement, which relies on heavy South Korean, Japanese and U.S. investment, may lead to closer multilateral cooperation on other peninsular issues.

On the negative side, there are still many security issues left unresolved. These include: the confirmation of already existing nuclear warheads and their disposition; the existence of a million plus conventional military machine aimed at South Korea; the continued isolation of North Korea in relation to South Korea and her neighbors; and reunification.

The best way to solve these issues and induce North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program is to "solve their most urgent need, the security and survival of the North Korean regime." (Suh, 1993, p. 80) North Korea will become more confident of its security through participation in confidence building measures and greater cooperation with its neighbors. Furthermore, if North Korea continues to pursue its policy of opening up to the outside world, it will only be a matter of time before Pyongyang establishes diplomatic ties with the U.S. and Japan. When this happens, it will be even more important to engage North Korea and eventually a unified Korea in mechanisms for enhancing regional stability.

IV. SECURITY VIEWS OF THE U.S., JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA

As was the case with China, Russia and North Korea (or the former Communist side of the Cold War), I shall list the national interests, the security concerns and grand strategies of the United States, Japan and South Korea and conclude each section with an analysis of each nation's views on multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia.

A. U.S.

I shall list U.S. interests in East Asia as they apply to Northeast Asia. Then I will show what situations threaten those interests.

1. U.S. National Interests and Objectives in Northeast Asia

The 1992 report to Congress entitled A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim lists United States security interest in Asia as follows (DOD, 1992, p. 9):

- Protecting the United States and its allies from attack.
- Maintaining regional peace and stability.
- Preserving our political and economic access.
- Contributing to nuclear deterrence.
- Fostering the growth of democracy and human rights.
- Stopping the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems.
- Ensuring the freedom of navigation.
- Reducing illicit drug trafficking.

During his confirmation hearings on March 31, 1993, Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and

Pacific Affairs, listed ten major goals for American policy in Asia and the Pacific (Lord, 1994, pp. 5-17). Here I have listed, not in any order, the seven that apply directly to U.S. interests and policy in Northeast Asia.

- Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities.
- Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula.
- Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with China when political openness catches up with economic reform.
- Strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation.
- Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundation of our alliances.
- Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment, refugees, non-proliferation and arms sales.
- Promote democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower.

Addressing East Asia and the Pacific specifically, the White House 1994 report "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" lists the three pillars of the "New Pacific Community" (The White House, 1994, pp. 23-24):

- Pursue stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula.¹¹
- Develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities.
- Support the wave of democratic reform sweeping the region.

¹¹The original statement includes combatting proliferation in South Asia as well.

2. U.S. Security Concerns and Grand Strategy in Northeast Asia

Stanley O. Roth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asia and Pacific Affairs), outlined the threats to U.S. security interests during the 1994 Pacific Symposium.

While the threat of Russian power projection has receded, we must take into account the possibility of Russian fragmentation or a substantial lessening of Moscow's control over the Russian Far East.... The region is burdened by other legacies of the Cold War, most notably the tottering but dangerous regime in North Korea, and the Soviet annexation of the Northern Territories of Japan. Additionally, new post Cold-War dangers--the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the potential conflicts and crises that threaten regional peace and stability; the challenge to democracy; and the significance of economic factors--all are concerns that must be addressed. (Roth, 1994, p. 233)

It is to cope with these concerns that the United States is searching for its own grand strategy to deal with Northeast Asia.

- The Korean Peninsula

North Korea is considered a serious threat to U.S. efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The U.S. is concerned that North Korea's nuclear weapons program may encourage the spread of nuclear weapons not only in Northeast Asia but also in other regions, specifically the Middle East. Additionally, the U.S. is concerned that a continuation of North Korea's nuclear program would encourage South Korea and Japan to acquire their own nuclear weapons, and China would be less likely to reduce its nuclear arsenal if the Korean Peninsula is nuclearized. (Park, 1993, pp. 85-86)

The October 21, 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreement, outlined earlier, seems to have assuaged the immediate threat of North Korea's nuclear program for the time being. However, Korea will remain a significant security concern as long as the U.S. is committed to help South Korea in deterring an attack by the North.¹²

- China

Above all, the U.S. is concerned with China's contribution to nuclear proliferation and regional arms sales.

We must engage...China, [and other] countries that are advancing economically and technologically, on questions of proliferation. We must be especially attentive to weapons and technology transfers to regimes in the Middle East and South Asia....
(Roth, 1994, p. 238)

These concerns include Beijing's sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, missile sales to Iran, its suspected sale of nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran, and Beijing's purchase of advanced Russian weapons (Fisher, 1994, p. 115). Further, the U.S. is concerned about China's military modernization and development of power projection forces. The U.S. has tried in vain to persuade China to discard its policy of using force in solving the problems of Taiwan and the shadow of force looms ominously over the South Seas.

The linkage of human rights and trade disputes has clouded China relations for years, and China never will take kindly to American preaching about democracy. The Clinton administration has made it abundantly clear that it supports China's program of modernization and wishes to promote the

¹²Problems with the U.S.-ROK alliance and the issue of burdensharing will be discussed later.

responsible integration of China into the Asia-Pacific Community. (Lord, 1994, p. 9; Roth, 1994, p. 237)

- Russia

U.S. concerns about Russia also encompass a broad range of issues including nuclear and arms proliferation, fragmenting forces in the Far East, and the impact territorial disputes could have on regional stability. Most importantly, the U.S. recognizes that a stable economic structure and political regime in Russia is the best guarantor of Russia's role in a stable Northeast Asia (NYT, March 8, 1992).

With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is no longer opposed to Russia's involvement in the Pacific and is seeking to keep Moscow engaged in the region. In April 1993, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton signed the Vancouver Declaration stating that "through their joint effort, both countries managed to form a new quality of the Russia-American relations..." to coordinate "a comprehensive strategy of cooperation to promote democracy, security, and peace." (Quoted in Bunin, 1993, p. 10). U.S. and Russian tension reductions in Northeast Asia have been unilateral and bilateral measures, but both would gain if security issues were discussed on a multilateral level. (Bunin, 1993, p. 12)

- Japan

Government documents and officials alike have stated that the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is the key to U.S. strategy in Asia. For example:

The US-Japan relationship remains key to our Asian security strategy.... US forces in Japan provide for stability throughout the region, and remain an essential element of the deterrent against North Korean adventurism. The continuing US presence in Japan and the strength of the US-Japan security

relationship are reassuring to many nations in the region as well as to Japan. (DOD, 1992, p. 4)

Our alliance with Japan is fundamental to our Pacific security policy. From our bases there, we deter conflict, preserve U.S. influence, and position forces forward for rapid response to crises. (Roth, 1994, p. 236)

Over the last few years, the U.S.-Japan relationship has been under strain mainly due to bilateral trade imbalances. The U.S. has complained that the trade imbalance is a result of Japan's restrictive market. Japan has become impatient with America's failure to address its own budget deficit and saving imbalances, which are undermining U.S. competitiveness. (Roth, 1994, p. 236) Both sides recognize that if the Japanese-American trade tensions explode, the security relationship would suffer.

- The Bilateral Alliances and Burdensharing

Since the end of the Korean War, regional stability has been maintained by two bilateral alliances dominated by U.S. economic and military strength. The U.S.-Japan alliance has traditionally served, and remains, as the focus for the American position in Asia. Due to changes in the ever shifting world system, the importance of the alliance has been modified in significant ways. The disappearance of its chief rival and its own relative economic decline have resulted in U.S. military reductions in the region and Japan's economic success, achieved under the umbrella of the alliance, has enabled Japan to take a bolder role in the international security arena. Since the end of the Korean War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been the primary deterrent against another invasion of the South by North Korea. Bilateralism in Korea has a long history and has contributed to the stability of the region. (The Ministry of National Defense ROK, Defense White

Paper, hereafter KDWP, 1993, p. 29) Similar to the U.S. Japan relationship, the U.S. security umbrella has been a factor in South Korea's emergence as a significant economic and political power in Northeast Asia.

However, the demise of the threat around which both alliances were built, and increasing domestic pressure to cut defense spending in the interest of reducing the budget deficit, has caused the U.S. to rethink the nature of its commitment to its allies. Since the mid-1980s the U.S. has steadily reduced its defense spending while pressuring its allies to share more of the burden for their defense.

Both Japan and South Korea provide more resources for their own defense as a result of the burdensharing agenda. Both nations have also enhanced their own foreign and security policy initiatives apart from the bilateral alliances and U.S. leadership. Japan provides \$3 billion, about 75%, of the total nonlabor U.S. costs in support of American forces in Japan (Levin, 1993, p. 74). Japan has also extended its defense capabilities to include air-and-sea defense up to 1,000 nautical miles from its coast and up to 500 nautical miles on either side of Vladivostok (Chace, 1992, p. 90; Levin, 1993, p. 74). The U.S. also benefits from the expense it saves by deploying forces in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East from Japan rather than solely from U.S. territory.

South Korea currently contributes \$220 million in several areas related to supporting U.S. forces on the peninsula. The two countries agreed that by 1995 South Korea would gradually increase its share of the defense burden to cover one-third of the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Korea. (KDWP, 1994, p. 122) In a further move to support the "Koreanization" of South Korea's defense, operational control of its armed forces will be transferred to the South by December 1994. Sometime near the turn of the century, providing conditions on the peninsula

improve, South Korea will take the leading role in its own defense. (Park, 1994, p. 79)

The U.S. has been able to reduce its military presence in Northeast Asia as Japan and South Korea have assumed more of the defense burden. The April 1990 DOD report to Congress as well as A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim, contain a comprehensive U.S. force reduction plan. Reemphasizing the new U.S. overseas deployment policy-"from a leading to a supporting role"-the latter report calls for a continual but reduced U.S. naval and air presence in the Asia-Pacific throughout the 1990s (DOD, 1992, p. 19).

However, the plan specifically addresses groundforce reductions in Korea and Japan. During the first phase of reductions conducted from 1990-1992, 7,000 troops from U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) and 5,000 U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) were cut. (Park, 1994, p. 79; Cha and Kim, 1993, p. 117) Phase II, scheduled to take place in 1993-1995, has been suspended due to the North Korea nuclear issue. Once enacted, this phase would withdraw a further 6,000 forces from Korea. The third phase is still scheduled for 1996-2000 and will be aimed at keeping only a minimum level of forces in the Asia-Pacific region. (KDWP, 1994, p. 17; Park, 1994, p. 79; Cha and Kim, 1993, p. 117) U.S. forces in the Pacific, and Northeast Asia, are being structured

for an essentially maritime theater, placing a premium on naval capabilities, backed by essential air and ground forces for enduring deterrence and immediate crisis response. (DOD, 1992, p. 17)

Despite these modifications both alliances remain strong. First, the U.S. has voiced its policy of maintaining its balancing, although reduced, presence in Northeast Asia. Secondly, other nations of the region perceive the U.S.-Japan alliance as an effective way of keeping a short leash on Japanese expansion. Additionally, "the volatilities of

Japan's surrounding neighbors--Russia, China, and the Korean peninsula--reinforce Tokyo's desire to maintain the U.S. alliance." (Song, 1993, p. 3) South Koreans believe the U.S.-ROK alliance will most likely remain in place as long as the peninsula remains divided (Song, 1993, p. 3; Fic, 1993, p. 17).¹³

During the last four decades, ROK-US security cooperation has played a key role in deterring another North Korean invasion.... It has served as a foundation for the regional security of Northeast Asia and will continue to contribute to the development of...peace in Korea and Northeast Asia. (KDWP, 1993, p. 29)

Both Japan and South Korea have accepted the U.S. reductions while increasing their own defense capabilities. However, force reductions may cause the U.S. and its allies to face some difficult policy decisions in the future.

Faced with a staggering budget deficit and increasing pressure to trim defense commitments overseas in lieu of the perceived peace dividend resulting from the end of the Cold War, there have been calls for a significantly reduced military presence, not excluding the Asia-Pacific theater. Many feel that the time has come for the nations of the region to assume a greater role in defense burden sharing. This has raised fears that the U.S. could prematurely disengage from the region, including the Korean peninsula, prompting other regional powers-China, Japan or Russia-to possibly attempt to fill the resulting power vacuum. (Shin, 1993, p. 604)

¹³"Some quarters in Seoul, in fact, even favor an American presence after North and South are unified to safeguard the peace on the peninsula and beyond." (Fic, 1993, p. 17)

The U.S. is still committed to maintaining a military presence in Northeast Asia.¹⁴

It is important to recognize that U.S. military presence can take a variety of forms. The most important and relevant for the foreseeable future are our bases in Japan and Korea. Their operational, symbolic and economic value, particularly give the time-distance factors at work in the vast Pacific theater, make these bases the most compelling indicator of our resolve, as well as the best deterrent to military adventurism. (Roth, 1994, p. 239)

At the same time, as revealed in the documents cited above, the U.S. is seeking to balance its reductions in Asia with a commitment to supporting its allies through multilateral dialogues.

3. U.S. View of Multilateral Cooperation

The reluctance of the United States to endorse a regional multilateral system was a major obstacle to the formation of such systems in the past. Like the case of the Brezhnev proposal for a collective security arrangement, the U.S. also blocked the Pacific Alliance Treaty Organization (PATO), a NATO like plan for the Pacific proposed after the Second World

¹⁴The Pacific Command strategy of "Cooperative Engagement," formulated by former Commander in Chief Pacific Command Admiral Larson, provides the means for achieving this goal with forces already at hand. See Larson, Charles R. "Cooperative Engagement and Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific Region." Cooperative Engagement and Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. by Ronald N. Montaperto. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp.69-76; Larson, Charles R. "Cooperative Engagement." Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Summer 1993, pp. 3-6; McDevitt, Michael A. "The Strategy of Pacific Command." Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities. ed. by Michael D. Bellows, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994, pp. 149-156.

War. The United States has traditionally avoided multilateral initiatives in Asia. Cold War Europe was the primary area of concern for the U.S. and the U.S. felt that the military presence in Japan, and later Korea, was adequate to contain communism in Northeast Asia given the costs of containment in Europe. (Song, 1993, p. 8)

Furthermore, U.S. policymakers insisted that multilateral arrangements would damage its bilateral alliances. The U.S. was particularly wary of military cooperative security because it was believed that it would reduce its maritime superiority, the key to U.S. strategy in Asia. (Crowe and Romberg, 1991, p. 138; Ji, 1994, pp. 7, 10) In the late 1980s and early 1990s Washington was still concerned about the Soviet threat to the region and the U.S. saw any initiative such as an Asia style CSCE as providing the Soviets with a low cost means for leverage as a regional security actor (Mack, 1992, p. 23).¹⁵

Washington believed that Moscow would take advantage of multilateral security forums to push for security measures (such as arms control) which might have seemed superficially attractive but were inimical to the United States-and thus regional-security interests. (Mack, 1992, p. 23)

The Bush administration also pointed out that Asia was not divided into two blocs facing each other and it lacked a common threat to bind nations together in a multilateral arrangement. "Furthermore, they were concerned that if we entered into regional security dialogues it might look like a mask for withdrawal." (Lord, 1994, p. 16) They were also

¹⁵The Pacific version of a CSCE, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, was originally proposed by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in July 1990. See Mack, 1992, pp. 21-33 and Wiseman, 1992, pp. 42-59, for a comprehensive discussion of the proposal.

concerned about the effect a CSCE type proposal would have on the bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific.

If you form a collective organization, does this complicate your ability to invoke your treaty responsibilities in Korea, for example? (Solomon, 1994, p. 249)

A change in the U.S. view of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia is the result of two considerations. First, the nations of the region are more economically and militarily powerful than they were even a decade ago. They have shown that they can take a larger role in their own defense. Simultaneously, the U.S. realizes that it provides a stabilizing role in the region and that it must stay involved in Northeast Asian security in some form. Second, the end of the Cold War and the relative decline of its economic power has caused the United States to become "less enthusiastic and capable to take sole responsibility to maintain its leadership" in the region (Song, 1993, p. 2).

These two factors have led the U.S. to become more interested in a multilateral system in which it would be a stabilizing force, but not necessarily the dominant player. A multilateral framework, built on existing bilateral relations and specifying the U.S. role as regional balancer, may be a very effective means for remaining engaged in Northeast Asia. Multilateral cooperation provides a means for remaining involved in Northeast Asia while attempting to resolve the burdensharing issue.

A transition occurred in the perception of U.S. interest in multilateral forums starting in 1991. The Bush administration began to realize that cooperative security discussions in Asia were already taking place despite U.S. involvement. "The U.S. attitude has changed from opposition to support for flexible regional multilateral approaches to security concerns." (Ji, 1994, p. 10)

At the third APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Conference) meeting in Seoul, then U.S. Secretary of State William Baker announced his support for a "two plus four" forum.¹⁶ This forum would include the two Korea's and the four major powers in Northeast Asia. Discussing a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue would have been the primary focus. However, South Korea adopted the policy that peninsular issues should be handled primarily by the two Korea's and not by outside powers. This statement killed the Baker proposal. (Song, 1993, p. 8)

The Clinton administration has fully embraced multilateral approaches to security discussions. In 1993, President Clinton stated that development of a multilateral forum for security dialogue is a primary goal of American policy in Asia. Then at the G-7 meeting in Tokyo in July 1993, the President initiated the APEC leadership conference that was held in Seattle in the following fall.¹⁷ The agenda included regional economic and security issues. (Song, 1993, pp. 8-9)

Also in July 1993, South Korea and the United States agreed to hold talks on a Northeast Asian multilateral security dialogue that would be distinct from ASEAN. (Korea Herald, hereafter KH, July 13, 1993, p. 5; Fisher, 1994, p. 119) In November 1993, South Korea and the United States issued a joint statement declaring that "multilateral security dialogues can supplement their bilateral defense relations." (KH, November 7, 1993, p. 3)

Thus, the U.S. is willing to back some sort of multilateral security organization for Northeast Asia, but what form will such an organization adopt? Winston Lord's

¹⁶Basically the same proposal made in 1988 by Roh Tae Woo.

¹⁷This initiative raised APEC from the ministerial to the heads-of-state summit level.

statements summarize the principals on which U.S. willingness to engage in multilateral forums is based (Lord, 1994, pp. 15-16):

- A loose approach without an overly structured commitment-"developing multilateral forums for security consultations..."
- Primacy of the bilateral alliances-"...entering into regional security dialogues to supplement, not supplant, our allies and our alliances and our forward presence...."
- Includes subregional approaches-

At present it primarily revolves around security dialogue led by ASEAN countries with their dialogue partners the United States, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.... There will also be a need for more focused security dialogue in Northeast Asia. (Lord, 1994, p. 16)

- Cover a wide range of issues- including regional cooperation on the environment, refugees, non-proliferation and arms sales.

The point here is to get countries sitting around a table and conveying their intentions, whether it's on military budgets or territorial claims, to try to erase misperceptions, lower tensions, enact confidence building measures, deter arms races and prevent conflicts.... (Lord, 1994, p. 16)

B. JAPAN

The emergence of a multipolar security system, a shift in the balance between military and economic capabilities, coupled with the relative decline of U.S. power, and the broadening of security considerations to encompass more regional and "non-traditional" security concerns, are some of the major changes in the world and Northeast Asian security environment that have fueled the ongoing debate over Japan's post-World War II security policy. (Brown, 1994, p. 430; Shin, 1993, p. 606)

The most important element of Japan's post-war security system is the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan," written in 1951 and revised in 1960. The foundation for the treaty was Japan's post-war condition and the bipolar world system. These conditions

included a Japan that was too weak to defend itself against external danger, a threatening security environment and a sense of vulnerability among the Japanese leadership, a domestic and regional environment distrustful of Japan and hostile to Japanese rearmament, a critical need for Japanese economic reconstruction, and the bipolar structure of international politics with the United States locked in global competition with the Soviet Union. (Levin, 1993, p. 72)

Japanese interests in "economic reconstruction, international political rehabilitation, and ensuring national security evolved from these conditions." (Levin, 1993, p. 72) Under the aegis of the U.S.-Japan security agreement, Japan adopted the Yoshida Doctrine of focusing on economic matters, minimizing defense expenditures by relying on the U.S. security guarantee, and generally following U.S. leadership in strategic security and political issues (Brown, 1994, p. 430; Shin, 1993, p. 604).¹⁸

¹⁸After Prime Minister Yoshida. Interestingly Yoshida regretted his use of Article Nine to evade U.S. pressure on Japan to contribute more fully to its own defense and regional security.

In my recent travels, I have met with leaders of other countries who have recovered from war and are contributing to world peace and prosperity. I feel Japan should be contributing too. For an independent Japan, which is among the first rank countries in economics, technology, and learning, to continue to be dependent on another country is a deformity of the state.... For Japan, a member of the United Nations and expecting its benefits, to

Japan's Yoshida Doctrine and its reliance on the U.S.-Japan security agreement had two significant effects. First, Japan was able to focus its resources on economic development that led to the economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s. Secondly, Japan was able to adopt a unique sense of commitment to regional and international security. Article Nine of Japan's post-war constitution, as interpreted at that time, limited Japanese military forces to the defense of the Japanese Islands and prohibited participation in collective-self defense or collective security arrangements.¹⁹ (Pyle, 1993, p. 103)

Therefore, acceptance of the Security Treaty System meant that.... Japan's contribution to the world was made only through cooperation with the United States in terms of the bilateral relationship.... in the context of Pax Americana, commitment to international security, cooperation with the United States, and the security of Japan were all compatible. (Yamaguchi, 1993, p. 169)

These developments have been the basis of Japan's narrow post-war view of security issues.

avoid support of its peacekeeping mechanisms is selfish behavior. This is unacceptable in international society. I myself cannot escape responsibility for the use of the Constitution as a pretext for this way of conducting national policy. (As quoted by Pyle, 1993, p. 104)

¹⁹See Staples, 1989, pp. 111-116 and Pyle, 1993, pp. 103-104, for details on the evolution of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution from inception to allowing the formation of the Self Defense Forces in 1954 and policies concerning collective security arrangements.

1. Japan's Security Concerns and Grand Strategy

The end of the Cold War has served to intensify Japan's sense of uncertainty about its security environment. To Japan's policy makers, the relative stability of the Cold War has been supplanted by a diffuse security environment that is more uncertain. Japan's analysts must evaluate its threat perceptions in the process of devising a more comprehensive regional and international security policy.

These threat perceptions revolve around the Korean Peninsula, China and Russia. One may argue that these were also areas for Japanese concern during the Cold War, but I have shown that the tensions once stabilized by the Cold War strategic structure have taken on new meaning. As Japan continues to develop her own policies apart from the U.S.-led bilateral system, her government must learn how to deal with these problems from a fresh perspective.

The Korean Peninsula remains Japan's primary regional security concern (Japan Defense Agency, hereafter JDA, 1993, p. 33).²⁰ Until defense analysts have had time to see a favorable trend toward the successful execution of the October 21, 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreement, it is unlikely that this situation will change.²¹ In the past, neither progress in North-South dialogue or the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas to the UN in 1991 altered Japan's perception of Korea. The Peninsula remains a heavily armed camp, easily inflamed

²⁰Also see Brown, 1994, p. 437; Nishihara, 1994, p. 126; and Smith, 1994, p. 29.

²¹North Korea has established a trend in the past of disregarding agreements relating to its nuclear development program, notably its withdrawal from the NPT and its disregard for the North-South Basic Agreement and Joint Declaration. Given this trend and the nature of the U.S.-DPRK Agreement (see Chapter III) it is evident that North Korea will need time to establish credibility with her neighbors.

and harboring "an ill-concealed hostility toward Japan."
(Brown, 1993, p. 437)

For many Koreans, the harsh Japanese colonization of the Korea and the ruthless sixteenth-century invasions of Hideyoshi are as active a memory as yesterday's perception of another Japanese insult. It is no overstatement to say that being anti-Japanese is almost ingrained in the Korean national character. (Olsen, 1991, p. 380)

Besides the nuclear issue, Japan is concerned about North Korea's large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and the development of the means to deliver them at great distances. In 1993, North Korea tested the 1,000 KM range No Dong 2 ballistic missile that is capable of deploying such weapons in its payload (Brown, 1994, p. 437; Song, 1993, p. 5). Additionally, any war between the Korea whether nuclear or conventional has the possibility of flooding Japan with a massive flow of refugees, adding the threat of internal instability to Japan's concerns.

Japan's worst case scenario, short of nuclear war, of a unified Korea lurks just below the surface of amicable cooperation. "A union of resource rich North Korea and a successfully capitalist South Korea might be a formidable rival to Japanese power in Northeast Asia." (Segal, 1991, p. 763) Add to this the possibility of a reduced U.S. presence or the absence of a U.S. bilateral treaty and a nuclear armed Korea, it seems reasonable that Japanese policymakers may see the benefits of two Korea. (Nishihara, 1994, pp. 96-97; Segal, 1991, pp. 762-763)

Japan's relations with South Korea are amicable but remain on shaky ground. This is due both to past history and Japan's expanding international security role. "First, . . . Koreans are profoundly conscious of Japan's historical role in Korea from the 1890's through the Second World War." (Olsen, 1992, p. 138) Secondly, Koreans resent the traditional place

Japan holds as the primary priority in U.S. security policy in Asia. These traditional concerns cause most South Koreans to hesitate about a Japanese role in regional security. This is especially true in terms of any proposal for Japanese leadership in a multilateral security structure.

South Korean concerns are heightened by U.S. pressure on Japan to share more of its defense burden. There is a feeling in the U.S. that Japan is free-riding on American security guarantees. This has led the U.S. Congress to pressure Japan to contribute more to its own defense. A larger Japanese military establishment combined with a reduced U.S. defense presence perpetuate anxieties about Japan's role in regional security. (Olsen, 1992, p. 138)

From Tokyo's perspective, South Korea is a challenge to its economic position in Asia. Seoul's normalized relations with Russia and China and greater economic cooperation with North Korea under "Nordpolitik," were seen by Japan as a move to reduce Japan's influence in Northeast Asia. (Brown, 1994, p. 437) Despite these underlying tensions, Japan seems committed to cooperating with the South Korea and the U.S. in attempts to open North Korea to the international community and contributing to an environment conducive to reunification.

Sino-Japanese relationships are very positive at the moment. During the March, 20 1994 meeting with Li Peng, Prime Minister Hosokawa said that Japan will continue to support China's policy of reform, opening-up and modernization, and will continue to support China's participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In return, Chinese President Jiang Zemin told Hosokawa that China is willing to strengthen its cooperation with Japan to ensure long-term stability in Asia and to contribute to the new world order. (Beijing Review, hereafter BR March 28, 1994, p. 4)

However, Japan has joined its Asian neighbors in raising concern over China's growing defense budget, the modernization

of its armed forces, particularly the PLA (N), and its renewed assertiveness over territorial issues. Some analysts in Japan are concerned that, in the future, an economically prosperous but authoritarian Chinese regime may harbor hegemonic ambitions in Asia.

Japan, too, is moderately concerned that a revived Chinese nationalism could lead to territorial disputes with the PRC over the Senkaku Islands. Although there is little sense of immediate danger...for the first time since the 1970s the notion of China as a threat to the region is gaining currency. (Grant, 1994, p. 64)

The PLA(N)'s desire to purchase or build some sort of aircraft carrier, more than the increasing defense budget, is the largest symbol of China's future ability to project power to protect its maritime interests. Japan is interested in these developments because any attempt by China to use force to secure its claims in the surrounding seas has the potential for disrupting the sea lanes of communication crucial to Japan's links to the oil resources of the Middle East.

Regional assumptions about the long-term intentions of the PLA(N) were upset by the July 1992 report in Sankei Shimbun that China was negotiating the purchase of the incomplete Russian aircraft carrier Varyag from Ukraine. Though the attempt fell through, it had lasting consequences on regional attitudes toward China. (Preston, 1993, p. 61)

The thought of the PLA Navy acquiring a power-projection capability sent ripples of apprehension through regional capitals from New Delhi to Tokyo, and even as far away as Canberra. (Preston, 1993, p. 61)

Compounding regional anxiety over the aircraft carrier option is China's recent purchase of highly capable SU-27 naval strike aircraft and MIG-31 aircraft, recent improvements in amphibious and air-to-air refueling capabilities. Despite

the present lack of a carrier it seems China is committed "in principle" to the future possibility of purchasing or building its own small aircraft or helicopter carrier (Ji, ADJ, p. 24; Hu, 1993, p. 130).

Lending weight to the concern over China's military capabilities was the passage of "The Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas" in February 1992. The law claims "indisputable sovereignty" over all of the Spratlys, the Paracels in the South China Sea, and the Senkakau Islands in the East China Sea and the right to protect these claims with force if necessary. (Brown, 1994, p. 435; Glaser, 1993, p. 264) The first two claims indirectly affect Japan in that China would have maritime hegemony in an area critical to Japanese trade. The Senkaku Islands dispute is more of an immediate challenge to Japan, whose 1891 claim to the uninhabited islands has gone unchallenged until the passage of the Territorial Waters Law. (Brown, 1994, p. 436)

Japan's policy toward Russia is ambivalent. On one hand Japan recognized the need to cooperate with other powers in investing in Russia's move toward democracy in the interest of regional and global stability. Since the collapse of the August 1991 Russian coup, the Japanese have somewhat softened their attitude over the Northern Territories issue. The Japanese refusal to consider any economic aid for Russia without a solution to the territorial dispute has been subordinated to the need to ensure domestic stability in Russia. (Buszynski, 1993, p. 494)

Yet, the lingering dispute over the Northern Territories and the uncertainty surrounding Russia's military forces prevent Japan from adopting a more conciliatory policy toward Russia. Japan, like other Asian powers, concedes that Russian military power in Northeast Asia has declined. Defense of Japan 1993, Japan's defense white paper, acknowledges that

Russia's military activity has declined due to economic shortages and confusion in the military chain of command. But the white paper also stresses that

Russia's forces in the Far East...still constitute enormous military strength, including nuclear forces, and are still being modernized through the relocation of new equipment from the European region.²² (JDA, 1993, p. 5)

Japan still perceives that Russia is pursuing policies threatening to Japanese interests. The lingering Northern Territories dispute, Russia's remaining military might and her sale of nuclear technology to other Asian nations, will continue to cause concern for Japan into the foreseeable future. Japan can at least take comfort in the fact that Russia will also be preoccupied with domestic difficulties for the foreseeable future as well.

Japan's security role has slowly evolved since 1951 due to shifts in the regional and world security systems and U.S. pressure to assume more of its own defense burden. The small changes in the past have all been made within the realm of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.²³ Beginning with Prime Minister Nakasone's election in 1982, Japan began to recognize that it must expand its international role to a greater extent than in the past. Nakasone's theme was

²²Also see Brown, 1994, p. 433 and Nishihara, 1993, p. 86. "...One worrisome byproduct of the drastic reductions in Soviet forces in Europe was the transfer of some 10,000 tanks from the European theater to east of the Ural Mountains." (Mochizuki, 1993, p. 132)

²³Early efforts included; the participation of the Maritime Defense Force in RIMPAC (Pacific Rim) exercise in the 1970s, which opened the way for U.S.-Japan military cooperation; in the 1980's Japan's defense expenditures exceeded the one percent of GNP barrier; and Japan's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). (Yamaguchi, 1993, p. 171)

the forging of a new public consensus on the image of Japan as a fully sovereign nation within the international community, possessing the self-confidence and esteem necessary to play a leading role. (Bean, 1991, p. 11)

Japan's efforts to expand its security role, "commensurate with its position as an economic superpower," beyond the bilateral framework have become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War. (Shin, 1993, p. 604)

- Japan's Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) Law.

The Gulf War had a significant impact on Japan's expanding security role.

Japan's inability to send any personnel...to the Gulf during the war embarrassed those Japanese who felt that their country ought to be sharing risks with other like-minded nations in seeking international security. The prevailing interpretation of the constitution prevented any member of the Self-Defense Forces...from participating in the efforts of the UN-supported coalition forces. (Nishihara, 1993, p. 90)

Japan's June 1992 PKO law now allows Japanese Self-Defense Forces to serve overseas under UN peacekeeping operations. Under this law, the Japanese government deployed a 600-man SDF contingent to participate in UN operations in Cambodia. This was the first overseas deployment of Japanese armed forces since World War II.²⁴ (Brown, 1994, p. 440)

²⁴The conditions of the PKO law allows Japan to dispatch up to 2,000 Self-Defense Force personnel abroad to participate in UN peacekeeping operations provided they meet five criteria: a cease-fire agreement must exist, a Japanese role must be accepted the parties directly involved in the conflict, the UN forces must be neutral, the SDF must be withdrawn if the truce collapses, and personnel can only use arms in self-defense. (Pyle, 1993, p. 105)

- Japan's pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Japan has been actively seeking support for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. In some views the current members of the Security Council represent the Cold War world order. Japan's membership would reflect its status as a economic superpower in an age of the relative ascendancy of economic power over military power.

- Japan's use of its position on the G-7 for political leverage.

Since the 1990 G-7 summit, Tokyo has been trying to mobilize support from the other members of the G-7 to apply pressure on Moscow to reconcile its position on the Northern Territories dispute. (Nishihara, 1993, p. 89)

- Efforts to influence events on the Korean Peninsula.

Japan is using its economic superpower status to influence events on the Korean Peninsula. After Gorbachev's recognition of South Korea, Pyongyang, in dire need of economic aid, attempted to break out of its isolation through diplomatic relations with Tokyo. The events surrounding North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was the primary cause for the breakdown in Tokyo-Pyongyang relations. (Nishihara, 1993, p. 89) However, Japanese financing for the building of nuclear reactors and providing oil supplies to North Korea will be a key to the successful execution of the October 21, 1994, U.S.-DPRK Agreement to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program (Gordon, New York Times, October 21, 1994, p. A2).

2. Japan's Changing View of Multilateral Cooperation

Japan's search for a new role in regional and global security has also caused a shift in Japan's post-war view

toward multilateralism, in the collective security sense, and cooperative security. John Foster Dulles tried to establish a regional security organization similar to NATO for the Pacific in 1950. Dulles' plan was for a Pacific defense alliance that would allow Japan to rearm under international control. Dulles believed that the alliance could reconcile Article Nine of Japan's constitution, prohibiting armed forces, with Article 51 of the UN charter, recognizing the right of nations to engage in collective security.²⁵ Prime Minister Yoshida was unwilling to participate in such a collective security system because he believed it would drag Japan into Cold War politics and force Japan to shift vital resources from economic recovery to military production. (Pyle, 1993, pp. 102-103)

Instead, he was determined to use the circumstance of the Cold War to Japan's maximum advantage and to pursue relentlessly a narrowly defined sense of economic self-interest.... Yoshida contrived to trade bases on Japanese soil for a U.S. guarantee of Japanese security and keep Japan as lightly armed as possible so that the nation could concentrate all its energies on economic growth....

²⁵Article Nine states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (Japanese Constitution, Article Nine)

It thus became an idee' fixe of postwar Japanese diplomacy-it was an essential corollary of the Yoshida Doctrine-to avoid any collective security commitments. (Pyle, 1993, pp. 102-103)

Just as the interpretation concerning Japan's constitution has evolved over the last forty so has its view of engaging in multilateral security. This evolution has sped up due to the end of the Cold War.

Participation in the founding of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) was Japan's first step toward providing regional security leadership (Brown, 1994, p. 442; Mochizuki, 1993, p. 154; Pyle, 1993, p. 112). During the July 1991 Kuala Lumpur ASEAN meeting, Foreign Minister Nakayama proposed establishing a forum in which ASEAN members and other interested parties could exchange views on regional security.²⁶ In 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa expressed support for a Canadian proposal for the member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to expand discussion to encompass regional security concerns. (Brown, 1994, p. 442; Pyle, 1993, p. 112)

It is apparent from these events that Japan has taken a greater interest in collective security under the UN and in regional multilateral security organizations. Japan's government has adopted a comprehensive view of regional security, incorporating many parallel elements at the bilateral and economic levels. Since 1992, Japan's official policy toward regional security cooperation includes the following points (Kawanago, 1993, p. 6):

- The sub-regional approach should be maintained.

²⁶Similar proposals had been made by Australia, Canada, and Russia previously but were rebuffed by the U.S. for reasons similar to those discussed above. (Pyle, 1993, p. 112)

- Multinational dialogue of regional security should be bolstered by two-way (bilateral) dialogue.
- U.S.-Japanese political cooperation should be strengthened.
- The U.S. presence should be maintained.
- Economic cooperation should be strengthened.

The difficulty for Japan lies in defining an appropriate and effective means for exercising greater international responsibility in an increasingly multipolar world while taking into consideration domestic and international arguments about that role.

C. SOUTH KOREA

The lack of a common security structure, the conflicting interests of the four main regional powers and the instability of the international arena, all cause concern within the South Korean defense policy establishment. (KDWP, 1993, p. 21) The U.S.-ROK alliance successfully neutralized South Korea's security threats during the Cold War, traditionally consisting of the threat of invasion from North Korea. However, South Korea's security concerns have become more complex since the end of the Cold War. The North Korean military threat still exists but it has been enhanced by the North Korean nuclear program.

Facing a reduced U.S. military presence in South Korea and Northeast Asia, Seoul has adopted other means to complement the U.S.-ROK bilateral alliance. South Korea perceives that a reduced U.S. military presence means that it must now expand its security interests beyond the Korean Peninsula. Seoul has sought to embrace a more comprehensive security plan through political and economic cooperation on a regional and global level.

1. South Korea's Security Concerns and Grand Strategy

South Korea's defense objectives are "'to defend the nation from armed aggression by potential adversaries, support the nation's efforts for peaceful unification, and contribute to the security and peace of the region.'" (Quoted in KDWP, 1994, p. 19) South Korea's objectives are potentially threatened by three critical factors. (Cha and Kim, 1993, pp. 127-131)

- Nuclear and Conventional threats from North Korea.

According to Korea's 1994 Defense White Paper,

North Korea has not abandoned its goal of communizing the South by force....Despite its serious economic troubles, North Korea has been strengthening its strategic military power by developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. (KDWP, 1994, p. 22)

North Korea's nuclear program has become a significant threat to South Korea. Until the program is dismantled in accordance with the October 21, 1994 U.S.-DPRK agreement, it will continue to be a threat. The nuclear situation has already contributed to political instability on the peninsula and if allowed to continue it may arouse public opinion in South Korea in favor of the development of its own nuclear weapons. South Korea is also concerned that North Korea's nuclear program might provoke Japan into producing nuclear arms and accelerate China's nuclear weapons modernization program. (Park, 1994, p. 86.)

In the future, if spending trends continue, South Korea may pass North Korea in conventional force capability. Whatever future trends may demonstrate, North Korea's

conventional military capability remains a significant post-Cold War threat.²⁷

North Korea has the capability and intention to use military forces if the circumstance permit and demand. It also has the experience of undertaking front-wide military operations in the Korean War of 1950-1953, and still seems to have a lingering attachment to the use of force as a means of achieving political and ideological goals. North Korea maintains a large standing force of more than one million, over one and a half time that of South Korea. (KDWP, 1994, p. 62)

Sixty-five percent of this highly mobile standing force is deployed in a high state of readiness near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea (Cha and Kim, 1993, p. 127). North Korea's large stockpile of biochemical weapons, currently the third largest in the world, adds to the North's balance (KDWP, 1994, p. 62).

The U.S.-ROK alliance will continue to serve as a deterrent to North Korean military threats in the near future. However, South Korea is exploring other methods of countering the North Korean threat in anticipation of a reduced U.S. presence on the peninsula and in the region. South Korea is slowly gaining more autonomy within the U.S.-ROK alliance and in execution of its policy toward North Korea. Internal development and outside purchases of advanced technology are areas in which South Korea holds a distinct advantage over North Korea. South Korea will continue to press its advantage in technology, military efficiency, and economic power. (Ohn, 1994, pp. 233, 242) The ROK is also reducing tensions by developing closer economic and diplomatic contacts directly with North Korea. Recent initiatives to create closer ties

²⁷See Ministry of Defense Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1993-1994, for a comparison of the military strengths of North and South Korea.

with the PRC and Russia as diplomatic tools against North Korea, have also become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War.

- Reunification

Two worst case scenarios threaten South Korea's goal of peaceful reunification. The first is an invasion by the North. North Korea has a history of aggression and terrorism and keeps open its options for both peaceful and violent reunification. Given these factors and if diplomatic and economic isolation continue, Pyongyang could strike out militarily in order to survive and to envelop the South. (KDWP, 1994, p. 56; Park, 1994, p. 87)

Peaceful unification of the two Koreas will not resolve all of South Korea's security problems. Absorption of the North by South Korea, the most likely scenario, will have many negative consequences. These consequences will threaten to destabilize the peninsula and the region. The communist regime could collapse if economic decline and isolation continue. South Korea fears that a chaotic and sudden collapse of North Korea will raise the costs of reunification. Waves of refugees and economic and political fallout resulting from the North's collapse, would in turn destabilize the regime in Seoul. (Park, 1994, p. 87) The potential for either of these scenarios should decline as South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and other nations engage North Korea in economic and diplomatic cooperation.

South Korea views North Korea as a partner in unification. To this extent, South Korea wants to neutralize the North Korean nuclear problem without prompting unnecessary conflict. South Korea's enemy-partner attitude adds further complexity to the nuclear and reunification issues. (Park, 1993, p. 86)

- Regional Stability

South Korea has determined that regional stability is a necessary precondition for maintaining its own security. Nuclear proliferation, arms buildups, and territorial disputes have complicated South Korea's objectives in the regional arena. Three nuclear powers, the United States, China and Russia, "are tangled in relationships each with respectively different security interests," and political systems (Song, KJDA, 1993, p. 188). North Korea's possible development of nuclear weapons has added to the complexity of this issue.

South Korea is concerned about the potential for a regional arms race. In 1991, \$7.5 billion dollars worth of arms were imported by Asian nations. (SIPRI, 1992, p. 308) In 1995 the total military expenditures of all Asian nations is projected to be \$131 billion. The nations of Northeast Asia are leading the rest of Asia in the amount of these military expenditures. Cheap Russian arms sales have become a major contributor to military buildups throughout Asia-Pacific (Cha and Kim, 1993, p. 131). China has been a leading importer of advanced arms and missile systems from Russia. Japan and South Korea are also embarking on programs to build advanced weapons systems, particularly naval vessels and missile systems. (Grant, 1994, p. 60; Preston, 1993, p. 60-64)

Nuclear proliferation and arms buildups further complicate the myriad of territorial disputes remaining in Northeast Asia. Left unresolved, some of these disputes could lead to armed clashes in the future (Cha and Kim, 1993, p. 131).

No regional, ethnic, religious and territorial conflict has broken out yet in Asia,...the potential for such an eruption does exist due to the complexity and diversity in economy, political systems, religions and races. (Song, KJDA, 1993, p. 190)

The concerns mentioned above have complicated South Korean security considerations. "Since the Korean War... security in the Korean context has evolved to incorporate many factors beyond the military balance on the peninsula." (Olsen, 1992, p. 137.) The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recognized the complexity of its security issues and the necessity for regional stability. To achieve its complementary goals of continued economic growth and regional stability, South Korea has started to diversify its national security policy. Improved international and regional trade relations, especially with Russia and the PRC, and the inclusion of cultural, environmental and social factors into security considerations, are all examples of South Korea's emerging "comprehensive approach" to national security. (Olsen, 1992, p. 147-152)

South Korea's impressive economic performance during the 1970's enabled it to move out of the shadow of the U.S. and grow in diplomatic stature. By the 1980's, the ROK was no longer derided by the Soviets as a puppet state of America. Korean-Soviet contacts became significant in the late 1980's. This was largely a result of the new thinking in Moscow (glasnost and perestroika) and South Korea's "Nordpolitik." "Nordpolitik" generally refers to the South Korean policy of enhancing its regional security through closer ties with socialist nations and potential adversaries, particularly North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. (Jordan et al., 1993, p. 368; Ohn, 1994, p. 232)

At the end of the Cold War South Korea normalized relations with Eastern European countries first. The landmark "Nordpolitik" event was the meeting between Roh Tae Woo and President Gorbachev in San Francisco on June 4, 1990. In September of 1990, the United Nations Summit of foreign ministers announced an agreement between South Korea and the

USSR that diplomatic relations would be established. (Jordan et al., 1993, p. 368; Olsen, 1992, pp. 146-147)

Seoul was primarily interested in the Soviet Union's, and later Russia's, influence on North Korea concerning reunification. This interest later extended to the nuclear issue as well. (Bogaturov, 1993, p. 233; Han Sung-Joo, 1993, p. 233) As discussed earlier, Russo-ROK ties remain stable but they have become limited due to Russia's economic plight and loss of leverage over North Korea in oil and arms sales.

The PRC was the first of the Communist countries to have substantial trade with South Korea, initially through Hong Kong, beginning in 1981. China became South Korea's most significant communist trading partner in the late 1980's. Two-way trade reached \$3.2 billion in 1988. (McDonald, 1990, pp. 214, 252) Substantial economic relations with China laid the foundation for further diplomatic cooperation, starting with PRC's recognition of South Korea in August of 1992. Subsequent trade with China grew rapidly and quickly surpassed China's trade with North Korea. Bilateral trade reached \$8.2 billion in 1992 and \$10 billion in 1993. China is now South Korea's third largest trading partner. (BR, March 28, 1994, p. 28; Lee and Sohn, 1994, p. 7)

As a result of South Korea's "Nordpolitik," ties between North and South Korea became warmer. South Korea became the North's fourth largest trading partner by 1992. Economic cooperation laid the basis for diplomatic contact.²⁸ The first ever talks between the Korea's heads of state took place in September 1990. In 1991, North Korea withdrew its long-standing objection to both states joining the United Nations as separate entities. Both nations joined the UN in September 1991. The warming trend in North-South relations was

²⁸See Chung, 1993, pp. 40-43 for a listing of the various forms of North-South economic cooperation.

strengthened by the joint signing of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Agreement in December 1991. All of these events

seemed to have created the proper conditions needed to get out of the trenches of the Cold War, but the...North Korean demarche with regard to the NPT deadlocked the situation again. (Bunin, 1994, p. 15)

Hopefully North Korea's cooperation with the U.S., South Korea, Japan and other powers in complying with the October 21, 1994 U.S.-DPRK agreement will place the peninsula on stable ground once again.

2. South Korea's View of Multilateral Cooperation

Since President Rhee tried to promote a "Northeast Asia Treaty Organization" in the late 1940's, South Korea has been interested in promoting closer multilateral regional cooperation. The Association of Pacific Nations (ASPAC) of the 1960's and 1970's was also a South Korean initiative. (McDonald, 1990, p. 239) In October 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo proposed a six-nation "Consultative Conference" comprised of the United States, the USSR, the two Korea's, Japan and China. The conference would "deal with a broad range of ideas concerning stability, progress, and prosperity within the region" and "create an international environment more conducive to peace in Korea and reunification of the peninsula." (Quoted in Chace, 1992, p. 117 and Mack, 1992, p. 22) President Roh's speech in the United States in June 1991 called for a "structure of cooperation in Northeast Asia." (Mack, 1992, p. 22) However, United States reluctance to endorse a regional multilateral system has been a major obstacle to the formation of such a system.

This reluctance has somewhat diminished in the recent past and multilateral cooperation has once again gained momentum in South Korea's regional diplomacy. This is a

result of the potentially volatile security environment and because of the growing trend of closer bilateral cooperation between the nations of Northeast Asia. South Korea and the United States agreed in July 1993 "to start talks on Northeast Asian multilateral security dialogue that would be a smaller but separate arrangement from the existing Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)." (KH, July 13, 1993) In November 1993, South Korea and the United States issued a joint statement declaring that "multilateral security dialogues can supplement their bilateral defense relations and enhance the building of a New Pacific Community." (KH, November 7, 1993)

Young-Sun Song, a well known defense analyst at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis, laid out the "ROK's perspective" on multilateral cooperative security in a paper presented before the First Northeast Asia Defense Forum in Seoul Korea.²⁹ (Song, 1993, pp. 12-16)

- Focus on cooperative rather than collective security.

Multilateral security should focus on cooperative, rather than collective, security. "In Northeast Asia where mutual distrust and misgivings prevail..., the chance of formulating such a collective security system is almost insubstantial." (Song, 1993, p. 14) This cooperative system would focus on reducing tensions and preventing war. It would be aimed at preventing aggression and threats from destabilizing the region. Such a system would work to promote mutual understanding of threat perceptions among the member nations and lower the risk of misunderstanding.

²⁹See also Song, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 1993, pp. 185-206.

- Multi-layered, incremental approach.

Dialogue within the system would be multi-layered and incremental. Cooperative efforts should be carried out on dual track, official and unofficial, levels. It should begin by dealing with areas outside traditional military security, such as economic and environmental security. An incremental approach would first deal with areas of common interest but low potential for conflict. This will establish the basis for the dialogue and cooperation process. More difficult issues can be tackled after a groundwork for cooperation has been established.

- Complement current bilateral treaties.

A multilateral system should not be viewed as a replacement for bilateral security treaties. "The existing US-centered bilateral security arrangements have contributed to the regional stability during the Cold War as well as at present...." (Song, KJDA, 1993, p. 198) This is due to the unique strengths of the bilateral treaties including, firm military commitments, established decision making channels between two nations, and a history of successful military cooperation.

Multilateral arrangements in Asia would need several additional features. They would have to cover a larger area, geographically and strategically, than the bilateral treaties. They must deal with a much wider range of interests that cannot be properly addressed by the bilateral treaties. (Song, KJDA, 1993, p. 198)

- Subregional in scope and membership.

The membership would consist of the ROK, U.S., PRC, Japan, and Russia. A seat for North Korea would be created with hopes that it can be persuaded to join.

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo, calling Asia and the Pacific inseparable, named a 'noninterventionist China, a nonthreatening United States and a non-nuclear Japan as the three pillars to peace in the region...The two most dependable elements in this relationship are the self-restraint that China has traditionally imposed on its expansionist impulses, and the mixture of idealism and realism in U.S. policy toward Asia.... Korea and China along with other interested powers may start searching for a mechanism for the peace and stability of the region.... A Northeast Asian multilateral security framework is simply an idea whose time has come.' (KH, October 28, 1993)

V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has unleashed "a growing sense of self reliance and even assertiveness in the region...." (Hitchcock, 1994, p. 91) Doubts about U.S. regional strategy and the ambitions of Japan and China shape the security environment of Northeast Asia. A perceived power vacuum and the power ambitions of the regional powers has led to security concern over arms races, nuclear proliferation, and a proliferation of local conflicts. These elements make the maintenance of the status quo undesirable.

The current bilateral approach to security cannot stand alone. This approach does not do enough to preclude the disengagement and isolation of any of the major regional powers (Cronin, 1993, p. 171). Furthermore, security can no longer be based solely on military methods of peace maintenance. Security is no longer conceived of in narrow military terms. There is a need for cooperative security in Northeast Asia that is aimed at engaging all of the regional nations in dialogue and cooperation.

Because of the atmosphere of distrust and the potential for conflict, it is inevitable that a multilateral approach to security will be difficult. The nations of the region are wary of collective security or collective defense based on European models. Asian nations view these models as incapable of addressing their security needs. This is because of the heterogeneity of Northeast Asia and because the effectiveness of those models in the post-Cold War era has yet to be demonstrated. Northeast Asian powers are also concerned that any nation proposing a collective multilateral security system

is trying to dominate the region.³⁰ Any acceptable arrangement must involve an on-going series of dialogue or ad hoc meetings but not a formal institution.

A multilateral system of cooperation, in which each of the regional powers are equal players, however, seems the best approach. Any informal system of cooperation, transparency and confidence building measures would not be dominated by any single nation or coalition. Nor would it be aimed at any nation or coalition.

The construction of a system of collective security or collective defense in Northeast Asia is idealistic. Instead, a cooperative system would focus on reducing tensions and preventing war. It would be aimed at preventing aggression and diffusing the potential threats to regional stability. The membership would initially consist of the U.S., ROK, PRC, Japan, Russia. A seat for North Korea should be created with the hopes that it could be persuaded to join. Provision should be made for a unified Korea, should reunification be accomplished.

Regional cooperation has been effective so far in preventing nuclear proliferation, but a more closely knit sub-regional combination may be needed to continue to deal with the threat in North Korea. Multilateral cooperation could go beyond the nuclear problem and aid in the peaceful transition to a unified Korea.

Although there are no other clear and immediate dangers in Northeast Asia, there are many unresolved problems of security that warrant multilateral cooperation. All regional

³⁰The Pacific Forum conference of CSIS held in Honolulu, Hawaii on October 28-30, 1991, in which 35 people from ten Pacific nations participated, concluded that "European models of security cooperation are not yet transferable to Asia" and "Asia security should be built on subregional blocks." (Quoted in Ball, 1993, p. IX) For similar views see Lewis, 1989, p. 7-9; Richardson, 1993, p. 14; and Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 13.

powers are concerned about the emergence of hegemonic competition and the resultant arms races, nuclear proliferation, maritime security, and environmental protection.

Finally, the goal of multilateral cooperative security in the post-Cold War will enable the U.S. to reduce its defense spending in Northeast Asia. Multilateral cooperation and tension reduction will also encourage the U.S. to reduce pressuring Japan and South Korea to share in their defense burden. Cooperation in the reduction of the threat of military confrontation will allow all of the nations involved to spend less on defense and concentrate more on the goal of creating an environment conducive to modernization and prosperity.

A. DIFFICULTIES WITH MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Of course, there are difficulties inherent in any form of multilateral cooperation. What is viewed as a threat by one nation may be viewed as an opportunity by other nations (Lewis, 1989, p. 8). The list below is not inclusive but it does address some of the more obvious objections to the formation of multilateral cooperative security. It is notable that other international security organizations are facing similar questions.

- The nations of Northeast Asia face no all encompassing or significant threat to bind them together in multilateral cooperative security.

I think this is a false argument. It is a common international relations construct that nations tend to balance together against other threatening states (Walt, 1985, pp. 3-13). From the evidence it seems that nations may also balance together in the pursuit of common interests. How else can one explain the greater amount of bilateral cooperation that now

exists in Northeast Asia. The argument also fails to explain clearly why nations are participating more vigorously in region wide forums such as ASEAN, ARF, and APEC. I have shown that the nations in Northeast Asia share similar interests and concerns. I have also shown that these nations are willing to engage in some sort of multilateral cooperation that addresses these concerns. It may be true that the security issues facing Northeast Asia do not face a direct threat to stability in the short term, but if left unresolved, there is a strong possibility for disintegration in the long-term.

- Such a system may be perceived as an instrument to contain Japan and China.

A multilateral system of cooperation, in which each of the regional powers are respected as sovereign players is the best approach. A system that increases each nations confidence about its own security and its neighbors intentions should overcome this problem if the nations are sincere in their intent to cooperate. An informal system of cooperation, transparency and confidence building measures would not be dominated by any single nation.

In the intense competitive atmosphere that will exist in the twenty-first century, all of the participants should remind themselves daily that they play a competitive-cooperative game, not just a competitive game. Everyone wants to win, but cooperation is also necessary if the game is to be played at all. (Lester Thurow quoted in Kim, Vital Speeches, July 15, 1994, p. 580)

- Applicability of existing multilateral structures.

Why not just continue to incorporate the nations of Northeast Asia into existing region wide Asia-Pacific forums such as ASEAN and APEC? Both ASEAN and APEC show a promising trend toward multilateral cooperation and dialogue on regional

security and other issues, but their specific application to Northeast Asia as either a basis or alternative system has liabilities. First, the scope and agenda of these organizations are too broad and distinct to be aptly applied to the security issues of Northeast Asia. ASEAN and ASEAN-PMC is mostly composed of Southeast Asian nations. This organization cannot be expected to handle Northeast Asian issues with the same gravity as the interests of the majority of its members. (Song, KJDA, 1993, pp. 201-202) For example, South Korean participation in ASEAN-PMC has been very positive but South Korea does not wish to use this forum for discussing Korean unification for example.

Second, the threat of serious conflict is much greater in Northeast Asia than in Southeast Asia. The nations of Southeast Asia do not face issues of the same magnitude as a North Korean invasion or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ASEAN members are starting to solve their own problems by themselves apart from the U.S. and the rest of Asia. Thus they will not be willing to accept any new multilateral proposal that may impinge on their growing autonomy in security issues. (Grant, 1994, p. 62; Song, KJDA, 1993, p. 202)

The Asian Regional Forum (ARF), basically a dialogue mechanism occurring between the ASEAN ministers' meeting and the PMC meeting, is a promising new forum. However, its agenda is still ill defined, ranging "from the Korean peninsula to the Tasman Sea."³¹ (Solomon, 1994, p. 250) Neither ARF nor ASEAN includes North Korea, the most probable conflict trigger in the region, and even though China is an observer to

³¹Also see "ASEAN Regional Forum: Towards Cooperative or Collective Security in the Asia-Pacific?" Asian Defence Journal, September 1994, pp. 6-7, for a discussion on the prospects for ARF.

ASEAN, there is the historical tension between the PRC and ASEAN to overcome.

APEC is an effective vehicle for trade liberalization and economic integration, and although the 1993 meeting included regional security issues on the agenda, it will be difficult to expand this network to embrace security issues. This is because "such widely dispersed countries are involved and decisions are made on the basis of consensus, it is rather difficult to expect timely and substantial decision-making." (Song, KJDA, 1993, p. 201) According to Winston Lord, APEC is

a building block for a global approach to trade....It will be restricted, however, for the time being as far ahead as I can see, to economic issues. It will not become a security organization. (Lord, 1994, p. 15)

B. STEPS TOWARD MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY

In summary, the conclusion that emerges from this thesis is that the nations of Northeast Asia are searching for new modes of ensuring their security in the era of uncertainty marking the post-Cold War period. I propose that a multilateral cooperative security system in Northeast Asia be structured to contend with the negative trends of the post-Cold War world and engage all of the Northeast Asian nations together in a habit of dialogue and cooperation concerning similar security interests. Such a system should be based on the following common principles.

- Focus on Northeast Asia.

Analysts from most of the nations in Northeast Asia have expressed a desire to pursue a subregional approach to multilateral cooperation, specifically in Northeast Asia.³²

³²For examples see: Ball, 1993, p. 20, Ford, 1993, p. 10, Hitchcock, 1994, p. 103, and Lord, 1994, p. 16.

The reasons for a subregional approach were described in the introductory chapter of this thesis. The scope of membership would include the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and both Koreas. The membership could be expanded over time depending on the issues involved.

- Include military, economic and other "non-traditional" elements of security.

There is a need to deal with security in a broader range of issues, not just military security. Political, economic or environmental threats can cut across boundaries and conventional security alliances. There are also the issues of narcotics and ecological threats.

At the same time the system should not overextend itself. It should take an incremental approach of dealing with areas of common interest but low potential for conflict first in order to establish the dialogue and cooperation process (Cronin, 1993, p. 175).

- Complement the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK bilateral treaties.

The system should not be viewed as a replacement for bilateral security treaties. I will not pretend to prognosticate on the future viability of the bilateral alliances. They may or may not disappear as a result of the reordering of the security environment. For now the nations of Northeast Asia (except perhaps North Korea) have all expressed an interest in maintaining the bilateral alliances, whether it be to contain China, Japan or Russia, or to simply keep the U.S. involved, depending on each nations' interests.

- Should not be aimed at containing any one nation or coalition of nations.

This is necessary in order to move beyond the Cold War security system of confrontation between the Leninist nations and the U.S. led anticommunist nations. Also, if any new system was perceived to be aimed against a single nation or group of nation it would alienate potential players. The "Joint Declaration on the Essential Principles of Mutual Relations" between the PRC and Russia of 18 December 1992, states that both countries "reject membership in political-military alliances that direct one nation against the other." (Skaridov et al., 1994, p. 4) In addition, China has stated in its "Five Principles of Coexistence" that it will not join any mechanism directed at another country. These conditions also predicate against a collective security or collective defense organization in Northeast Asia.

- Critical balancing role of the U.S.

The United States is viewed as being the only nation that can play the role of a balancer and stabilizing force necessary for cooperation between the nations in Northeast Asia. America has traditionally avoided territorial expansion in pursuit of its interests in Asia. A U.S. presence prevents the opportunity for a regional hegemon to establish itself (Crowe and Romberg, 1991, p. 124). The U.S. presence also provides a stable environment for continued economic development, a goal of all the nations of Northeast Asia (Blagovolin, 1994, p. 45). Most important for cooperative security, the U.S. balancing role is necessary for its experience in fostering what Paul Wolfowitz, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, calls "Cooperative Relationships." It would be almost impossible for Japan and Korea to work together on matters of security without the American presence. (Wolfowitz, 1993, p. 80)

In The Pacific Century: American and Asia in a Changing World, author Frank Gibney summarizes the reasons for a

continued U.S. leadership as a positive influence. Japan would seem to self centered and politically unsure of itself. Russia and China are not ready until they resolve their political and economic problems. Korea faces the tremendous task of reunification. (Gibney, 1992, p. 533) This leaves the U.S. in the best position to play a role in encouraging the formation of a multilateral cooperative security framework in Northeast Asia.

C. ROLE OF MARITIME COOPERATION

The oceans play a vital role in Northeast Asia. The countries of Northeast Asia all depend on the sea for vital resources and economic prosperity. All of the nations of the subregion have an express interest in preventing the deterioration of regional stability. Significant threats to that stability are maritime in nature. Maritime forces provide a nation with flexible forward presence that can be built up or withdrawn quickly and relatively unobtrusively. Yet, the flexibility of navies and their ability to concentrate modern weapons on the boundaries of another state and the opaque nature of submarines, make the maritime environment potentially dangerous and destabilizing.

Naval force is becoming an increasingly universal means for combat operations, not only at sea but also, because of sophisticated deck aircraft and long-range cruise missiles, on land. Naval mobility and the potential for buildup of naval forces near the other side's coast make naval forces the most provoking and destabilizing type of armed force. (Staradubov, 1990, p. 67)

I do not advocate focusing strictly on maritime issues but, due to the importance of the seas and growing concern about maritime issues, maritime security could be a catalyst for establishing multilateral cooperative security. The United States is in a unique position to cooperate with Northeast

Asian nations in maritime cooperative security. The U.S. strategy in the Pacific has traditionally been maritime in focus. Based on A Strategic Framework for the Pacific Rim and "Cooperative Engagement," this strategy will continue. Both strategies already address maritime cooperation. Maritime cooperation and transparency are roles the U.S. participates in world wide with a solid record.

Presently there is little transparency or understanding between the maritime forces of Northeast Asia nations. The following confidence building measures could be established through multilateral cooperative security in Northeast Asia.

- Defense White Paper exchanges and more officer to officer exchanges and exercise observation between regional naval forces.

Currently only Japan, South Korea and the U.S. exchange defense white papers. Regional tensions can be minimized through confidence building measures between military establishments and discussions addressing arms control issues. This can be achieved by enhancing military transparency through annual meetings of senior defense officials and military commanders to exchange information about doctrine, strategy, and plans for exercises. Participation and observation of combined exercises should be encouraged. Such measures will develop understanding between the militaries of each country and minimize the possibility of military conflict.

- Formulate of an Incident at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), and an agreement to limit Dangerous Military Activities and regional cooperation in Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts and environmental cleanup.

The INCSEA and DMA agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were based on simple and effective navy-to-navy communications. They were aimed at preventing

misunderstandings and collisions between maritime forces operating in close proximity on the open ocean. These agreements along with SAR and environmental cleanup coordination are relatively simple steps toward regional cooperation. Maritime and environmental safety are concerns of all nations and they are non-confrontational issues. They can all be conducted at lower level navy-to-navy contact and do not involve issues of sovereignty or the intervention of a supranational agency.

- Cooperate in the protection of Sea Lanes Of Communication (SLOC's), including joint maritime surveillance, safety and Search and Rescue operations (SAR).
- Work toward cooperation on maritime environmental security issues, "including preservation of reefs, programs for regional seas and coastal areas...oil pollution and hazardous waste." (Ball, 1993, p. 33)

These proposals are non-provocative and require cooperation to protect common interests. Once these issues are addressed and a habit of multilateral cooperation is established, more comprehensive issues should be considered.

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